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Abstract
FIST is an emerging and unproven rapid acquisition model. There are four FIST
values that stand for Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny and 18 FIST activities. The
premise of the FIST theory is that programs that emphasize these four values will be
successful in delivering weapon systems on time and within budget by utilizing the tools
and activities presented in the FIST model.
The purpose of this research was to develop an Analytical Hierarchy Process
(AHP) model to be applied as a comparative tool against the original FIST model. The
AHP model is developed through an experiment that surveys project managers from
military and civilian sectors. The results determine the strengths, weaknesses,
repeatability, and validity of the FIST model. Additionally, recommendations are
provided for future use and improvements of the FIST framework. As an added benefit,
value differences between different segments of program managers are examined to
determine if there are any ideological disconnects in the community.
The results suggest that the FIST model is reproducible with the AHP theory and
that there are certain program characteristics that denote if a program would benefit from
being developed by FIST. However, there are distinct weaknesses to the model that
signify not all programs would succeed if FIST was employed during development.
Eleven additional activities are recommended for inclusion in the FIST model. Overall,
FIST is a starting point that requires additional attributes to truly be among the viable
solutions to the Department of Defense acquisition problem.
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FIST & THE ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS:
COMPARATIVE MODELING

I.

Introduction

Ward (2004) created the acquisition model named FIST with the goal of producing an
effective change in the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition
processes. The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a proven decision-making theory
that provides decision-makers with a framework for decomposing and structuring a
decision problem. The purpose of this thesis is to create a comparative model of FIST
utilizing AHP. This research tests the decision-making ability of AHP against an
emerging FIST theory on successful system development and delivery.
General Issue
The U.S. DoD defines the defense acquisition system as, “The management
process by which the Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely
systems to the users” (DoD Directive, 2003:4). According to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the share of programs with a 25 percent or more increase
in program acquisition unit cost has increased to 44 percent (GAO, 2008). This is an
increase of seven percent from 2000 to 2008. A subsequent GAO report stated that the
total cost of the DoD’s current portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs has
grown by over $74.4 billion, or five percent of the $1.58 trillion overall budget, in only
one year (GAO, 2012). Decomposing the budget reveals acquisition inefficiencies in
production attribute $31.1 billion to the growth with an additional $29.6 billion due to
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quantity changes (GAO, 2012). The DoD is clearly failing to provide users with the
promised effective, affordable, and timely systems.
Over the next 10 years, $600 billion in budget cuts will impact the DoD. These
budget cuts will lead to the “smallest U.S. Air Force in history in terms of personnel,
smallest ground force since 1940, and smallest number of Navy ships since 1915”
(Hodge, 2012). If budget cuts are administered indiscriminately across all programs,
individual acquisition programs could realize as much as a nine percent reduction in
budget. With almost half of all DoD programs already over budget, financial cuts would
be devastating. American Enterprise Institute scholar Mackenzie Eaglen stated “the cut
in the program side now is tending to hurt programs that are safety nets to bridge the
military for the next conflict” (Hodge, 2012). U.S. military forces may be fighting future
wars with outdated technology due to a failed acquisitions process.
Budget overruns are not the only problems facing DoD acquisitions. In 1986, the
Packard Commission stated, “Unreasonable long acquisitions cycles – ten to fifteen years
for major weapon systems is a central problem from which most other acquisition
problems stem” (Blue Ribbon, 1986:8). The GAO states that the average delay in
delivering initial operational capability for major defense acquisition programs has
increased by 32 percent, or 23 months, since the completion of the first schedule
estimates for the program. Longer development times lead to bloated budgets and
technology designed to counter threats that may no longer exist (Ward, 2009:11). This
was the case with the U.S. Army Comanche helicopter program that began in 1982 with
the intention of countering Soviet Union capabilities. In 2004, the Army cancelled the
Comanche program after having spent 22 years and $6.9 billion developing the weapon
2

system (Ward, 2012b). No Comanche helicopters were built and the doctrinal niche that
the system filled disappeared. During the Comanche’s 22-year development time, new
wars and threats emerged that made the Comanche’s mission obsolete and too expensive
to continue development. When weapon systems have too long of a development
timeline, the technology becomes obsolete, and the threat may have already vanished
(Ward, 2012b).
Based on the above, the current environment of DoD acquisitions produces
defense programs that are inefficient, unaffordable, and behind schedule. This
acquisitions environment cannot coexist with the budget cuts set to occur in 2013, and
war-fighters cannot wait decades to receive new weapon systems. An effective change in
the way the DoD manages the acquisition process must transpire for the war-fighter to
continue to receive the weapons needed to conduct and win future wars.
Background
“Innovation is not necessarily or even primarily a function of budget. Many of
the interwar innovations came at a time of low budgets and small forces” (Fitzsimonds
and Van Tol, 1994:29). This idea was further developed by Ward and Quaid (2006b),
who stated that restrained program budgets allow program managers to reject
requirements creep and remain focused on the primary mission of the weapon system.
When program managers are not allowed to use additional funding and schedule delays
as tactics to solving programmatic issues, innovation often occurs to solve the problems.
Innovations may include accepting reduced performance or creating cost-effective
solutions. Smaller budgets produce shorter schedules because programs cannot afford a

3

prolonged development. Shorter schedules lead to less personnel turnover in the program
office and greater accountability because project managers are forced to witness the
outcome of any program management oversights. Additionally, shorter schedules
provide the user with a new weapon system sooner and releases funding for other
programs. According to Ward (2009:1), “Smaller expenditures clearly correlate with
better operational performance and… better programmatic outcomes.”
Ward (2009:iv) outlines the FIST value set as an effective approach to system
development, which “enhances project stability, increases project leader’s control and
accountability, optimizes failure, fosters ‘luck,’ and facilitates learning.” The FIST
model stands for Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny. Project managers should
emphasize these mutually reinforcing values when making programmatic decisions.
Fast is a value that can be expressed in a program through maintaining deadlines,
reducing development times, and placing an emphasis on program speed. Program
managers do not accept schedule delays as solutions to problems. Instead, tradeoffs are
made to solve the problem within the time allotted, even at the cost of reduced system
performance. Programs that value being Fast benefit from having increased reliability in
funding and requirements, and decreased personnel turnover and obsolescence. Under
this value, program offices provide the war-fighter with weapon systems ahead of
schedule. Fielding weapon systems sooner allows the technology to be deployed against
the threat it was designed to counter instead of decades in the future on an unknown
battlefield, facing unknown threats (Ward, 2009:9-14).
Inexpensive is a trait found in programs that work within the budget and
deliberately seek low-cost solutions. Program managers are willing to sacrifice project
4

performance and attributes, as well as contractually incentivize contractors to finish under
budget, to ensure program costs remain under control while meeting program objectives.
Having a small budget fosters innovation because project managers must expend funds
wisely and create unique, low-cost solutions (Ward, 2009). Ward (2009) states that there
is an inverse relationship between cost and effectiveness; this concept means that
programs become less effective when additional funding is used as a program
management tool. Inexpensive is related to Fast in that small budgets cannot afford long,
expensive schedules. Inexpensive is also related to Simple due to small budget programs
choosing to leverage existing technology instead of developing new, unnecessary stateof-the-art technology (Ward, 2009).
The concept of Simple refers to maintaining a focus on meeting reasonable
operational requirements and leveraging available technology. Too often, program
managers, engineers, and users interpret complex technology as sophisticated solutions.
Complexity and beyond state-of-the-art technology increase schedules, budgets, and risks
because the program must bear the burden of developing and debugging new technology
from concept to delivery. Simple can also be interpreted as reducing the length and
complexity of formal procedures, briefings, and contracts. Simple, by its very definition,
reinforces the values of Fast and Inexpensive (Ward, 2009).
The last value of Tiny is an “inescapable outcome of the three previous values. If
your project is inexpensive, it has a Tiny budget. If it is Fast, it has a Tiny schedule. A
simple project has a Tiny degree of complexity” (Quaid & Ward, 2006:31). The Tiny
value means having a small project team that can effectively communicate with one
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another and to external parties. At some point, a large team becomes counterproductive
to the program (Ward, 2009).
Problem Statement
The FIST model is an emerging and unproven theory that has not been tested
thoroughly. The purpose of this thesis is to discover the strengths and weakness of the
FIST model by comparing it to a proven decision-making theory, AHP. Furthermore,
this research highlights if the FIST process is reproducible and reliable for analyzing
acquisition programs and successful system development. Next, is FIST a valid program
management tool that can be used in the acquisition community? In other words, does
FIST have enough depth and thoroughness to allow a program manager to use the FIST
framework to successfully manage a program? A byproduct of this research examines
the value differences in the military and civilian project management communities.
Lastly, areas of improvement to the FIST model and recommendations for future use are
given.
Methodology
The FIST values can be used as criteria for decision-makers as they choose
among alternatives and make funding decisions for programs. AHP incorporates
intangible and qualitative criteria into a quantitative decision-making process. The FIST
values can be applied to AHP as criteria to quantitatively establish the best choice among
alternatives. Criteria weights will be derived through an experiment by polling program
managers in the military and civilian industries. The FIST model’s internal reliability is
tested as a product of the experiment results. The AHP model is then used to create an
6

evaluation framework for programs. This framework can be used to evaluate acquisition
programs at competition or any point during development. Eleven programs from
Ward’s (2009) thesis will be analyzed by an AHP model based on the FIST values and
FIST grading rubric.
This research produced a best-to-worst ranking of the 11 programs using the AHP
model. By comparing the AHP model results with FIST results, it is hoped that insights
into FIST’s application, strengths, weaknesses, and repeatability can be discovered. If
FIST can be substantiated to be as accurate as a proven decision-making process, such as
AHP, it will significantly advance the knowledge and validity of the emerging theory.
Furthermore, the internal validity of the FIST model can be determined by gaining
consensus from the program management community on which aspects of the FIST
model are deemed most important. FIST advertises itself to be the solution to a troubled
DoD acquisition system with looming budget cuts. This research should further FIST’s
argument for adoption, recommend improvements, or expose FIST’s limitations.
Assumptions/Limitations
The Systems Engineering Efficiency Research (SEER) project was created to
provide greater visibility into the FIST model. A SEER phase I report was completed at
Arizona State University by Wu and Bhattacharya (2012). This thesis creates a
comparative model of FIST and AHP. The AHP model created will investigate the 11
programs that Ward (2009) analyzed. It is assumed that Ward (2009) ranked the
programs correctly using available information and the FIST scoring rubric. The AHP
model will only be as accurate as the depth of information available to analyze.
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Information on programs may be difficult to unearth due to individual program
sensitivities, classification, and age.
Additionally, the AHP methodology limits the number of alternatives to nine
(Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995). Therefore, this research was not able to analyze all 22
programs from Ward’s (2009) thesis. Lastly, the alternatives analysis will have to be
conducted by only the primary researcher of this study. It would be difficult to find
participants that are experts on each of the programs being evaluated. The alternatives
analysis was built off of Ward’s (2009) research. Since mission analysis was a
significant portion of his thesis, these researches choose to search for evidence that was
missing or inconclusive from his original examination.
Preview
The FIST model has been promoted as the solution to the currently unsustainable
state of DoD acquisitions. Chapter II will provide an extensive literature review of related
material on both the FIST model and the application of the AHP to weapon system
development and screening. Chapter III will describe the methodology of creating the
AHP model to which the FIST results will be compared. Furthermore, the process of
analyzing and ranking the 11 weapon system programs will be described. The results of
the AHP analysis will be presented in Chapter IV along with a restatement of Ward’s
(2009) FIST results on the same programs. Chapter V will provide a comparison of FIST
to AHP and discuss the strengths, weaknesses, and any recommended improvements to
the FIST model. Additionally, program characteristics will be highlighted that indicate if
a program should be developed under the FIST framework.
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II. Literature Review
With a development structure that has “unreasonably long acquisitions cycles”
and cost overruns due to acquisition inefficiencies, the current Department of Defense
(DoD) acquisition environment cannot be sustained with $600 billion in budget cuts
beginning in 2013 (Blue Ribbon, 1986:8). The United States (U.S.) DoD value system
rewards weapon systems under development that have large budgets, long timelines, and
complex technologies. Often, this practice leads to programs that overpromise
performance and overrun schedules. Ward (2009) developed FIST in an attempt to
change DoD acquisitions and provide program managers with an alternative value set to
utilize. The FIST model states that program managers should focus on the values of
being Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny when managing weapon system development
(Ward, 2009). The proposed result is a program that remains on schedule, on budget, and
delivers only the necessary technology to fulfill the capabilities required by the warfighter. Since FIST is an emerging and less mature model, this thesis uses the proven
decision-making theory of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) as a comparative
model to the FIST framework.
A chronological review of FIST publications will show the evolution of the
theory. Next, a brief history of AHP will be presented along with evidence that
demonstrations AHP as an effective comparative model. Lastly, current literature
describing project management and rapid acquisition success factors will be examined as
evidence of important activities not included in the FIST model.
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Relevant Research
The FIST concept has evolved from a series of publications beginning with Doing
Less with More in which Inexpensive is described (Ward, 2004). Simple is explained in
Ward’s (2005) publication, The Simplicity Cycle. Ward (2006) introduces Fast through a
publication entitled It’s About Time and Tiny through, FIST, Part 5. Ward continues to
publish material promoting the FIST model, its advantages, and uses.
Revolutions in Military Affairs
“Future revolutions will occur much more rapidly, offering far less time for
adaptation to new methods of warfare… rapid response to changing conditions in order to
survive in an intensely competitive environment is surely instruction for military affairs”
(Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, 1994:29). This means that the DoD should have a flexible
acquisitions system that delivers new capabilities rapidly to counter emerging threats not
previously envisioned. The F-22 Raptor is an example of a program that was initiated in
1985 with a designed operational capability to counter Soviet Union fighter aircraft. By
2005, when the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) was achieved for the F-22, the Soviet
Union threat no longer existed, but a new terrorist threat had emerged. The F-22 program
expended $32.1 billion in procurement costs. Currently, the Raptor lacks a viable
opponent and adds little value to counter the insurgency threat (Ferran et al., 2012).
Although this article was written 10 years before the FIST model first appeared, it serves
as support for the FIST value of Fast. According to Ward (2009), a Fast acquisition
system will produce weapon systems that can counter current threats. Threats and
capability gaps are not always predicted 20 years in advance to allow time for weapon
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development. An extended development timeline produces systems that may be obsolete
at completion or worse, may not be ready when needed, thereby preventing the U.S. from
winning future engagements.
The article states that often innovation stems from small budgets. Small budgets
force project managers to be more resourceful and exercise unconstrained thinking to
solve problems when adding cost is not a viable option (Fitzsimonds and Van Tol,
1994:29). The authors cite the development of the devastating German Blitzkrieg as an
example of an innovation developed under the tight budget restrictions of the Versailles
Treaty after World War I (WWI). Blitzkrieg was a revolution in military tactics that used
speed, deception, and surprise to defeat a numerically superior force. Germany forced
France’s surrender in a 6-week campaign during World War II (WWII) using Blitzkrieg
(Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, 1994:24). The Blitzkrieg development supports the FIST
value of Inexpensive by demonstrating innovation and technology advancement with a
small budget. Inexpensive technologies can prove just as effective if resourcefully
employed. Furthermore, Blitzkrieg is an example of the FIST value of Simple since the
same technology utilizing aircraft, tanks, radios, and soldiers were common to both sides
in WWII. Operational exploitation of these resources allowed Blitzkrieg to become an
effective, not complex, technologically-superior weapon system.
Doing Less with More: The Pitfalls of Overfunding
The FIST model is not directly mentioned in this article, but the concept is clearly
being formed (Ward, 2004). This article is the first installment of a five-part series
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describing FIST. The purpose of this article is to describe the significance of the
Inexpensive portion of the FIST model but also provides support for the Fast value.
The conclusion of the article states, “It is hard to avoid concluding that small
teams + thin budgets + short timelines tends to = significant innovation and combat
effectiveness” (Ward, 2004:34). This formula for success unmistakably resembles the
Fast, Inexpensive, and Tiny aspects of FIST. Ward (2004) supported his equation with
two examples of weapon system developments, the Bazooka and the M16 Assault Rifle.
The U.S. created the Bazooka during WWII with a development time of 30 days
and at a cost of $19 per unit. Immediate fielding of the Bazooka allowed the war-fighter
to provide critical feedback on the Bazooka’s flaws and shortcomings. The resulting
feedback allowed the engineers to make corrections to the design and add necessary
upgrades based on actual battlefield recommendations. Because the Bazooka was
inexpensive to produce, there was little fear in allowing soldiers to combat field-test the
new technology (Ward, 2004).
The M16 Assault Rifle took 20 years to develop and, like the Bazooka, initially
did not perform as expected. The differences in programs are that design flaws in the
Bazooka were quickly identified and corrected, allowing the weapon to be reissued
during WWII. User feedback for the M16 required 20 years to be incorporated into the
design of the weapon. “It does show the M16’s decades-long, disciplined, neat, orderly,
and well-funded development effort didn’t guarantee the system’s operational
effectiveness over the Bazooka’s month-long, quick-and-dirty, low cost approach. The
key to field success in both situations was… actual field experience and direct user
feedback” (Ward, 2004:32).
12

These two weapon system anecdotes provide the basis for the FIST model.
Furthermore, the Bazooka – M16 comparison supports Ward’s (2004) formula that rapid
development of inexpensive and simple technologies produce superior results and
combat-effective systems. Being Fast in weapon development is a key in this article as it
allows user feedback to be directly integrated into the final product. “Technology
developers tend to have facts about technology and fantasies about the operational (i.e.
combat) environment. In contrast, users tend to have facts about the operational
environment, and fantasies about what technology can do” (Ward, 2004:32). Being
Inexpensive allows more units to be produced, tested, and fielded. More testing is
completed on inexpensive systems because there is less fear of destroying the low-cost
unit (Ward, 2004).
The last point in this article states that DoD acquisition professionals view
programs that have more funding as prestigious and advantageous for their careers.
Furthermore, expensive acquisition programs receive more oversight regardless of the
capability or importance. Instead of rewarding successful program managers with more
expensive programs, they should be challenged to oversee a program with smaller
funding where mistakes cannot be overcome by a huge budget. Next, programs that
provide a vital capability should be considered a major defense acquisition program
(MDAP) even if the funding level is below requirements. According to the article, DoD
acquisitions should start to place emphasis on programs that deliver critical capabilities to
the war-fighter, not just expensive programs (Ward, 2004).
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On Failure
Failures in acquisition programs are inevitable. An important aspect of the FIST
model is that failures in FIST programs are optimized failures. Optimized failures are
where “exposure to loss is low and opportunities for learning are high” (Ward et al.,
2009:26). In traditional large programs that take decades to develop, failures are
expensive with few lessons learned to prevent future project management disasters from
occurring. Many of the original decision-makers in large programs have moved on to
different jobs and do not have the opportunity to witness the outcome. “Learning requires
both observation of the phenomena and timely reflection followed by action” (Ward et
al., 2009:26).
By FIST programs maintaining fast schedules, FIST failures are more likely to
convey meaningful insights to project managers because the project team is still intact to
witness the consequence of their decisions. The lessons learned will be used in future
programs and passed on to upcoming project managers. Additionally, since the FIST
approach promotes inexpensive programs, failures are more tolerable and affordable.
In the 1990s, NASA initiated a program coined Faster, Better, Cheaper. Then
NASA administrator Daniel Goldin stated, “[A] project that’s 20 for 20 isn’t successful.
It’s proof that we’re playing it too safe” (Ward et al., 2009:27). Rather than measure
failure based on a per-attempt basis, perhaps the acquisition community should judge
failure on a per-dollar basis. This is because one failed Major Defense Acquisition
Program (MDAP) could cost more than a dozen FIST program failures (Ward et al.,
2009:27).
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Faster, Better, Cheaper Revisited
Goldin (1992) originated NASA’s goal to produce missions that were faster,
better, and cheaper. In 8 years under the Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) initiative, 16
missions were launched with ten successes and six failures. Missions included “five
missions to Mars, one mission to the moon, three space telescopes, two comet and
asteroid rendezvous, four Earth-orbiting satellites, and one ion propulsion test vehicle”
(Ward, 2010:50). One successful mission example from FBC is the Near Earth Asteroid
Rendezvous (NEAR) project that launched in 1996. The program was completed in 27
months and for $122 million instead of the previously estimated $200 million. The FBC
initiative was cancelled in 1999 after four out of five missions failed. The success rate
was deemed unacceptably low (Ward, 2010).
Looking further into the data shows that the FBC missions were incredibly low
cost. The 1997 Pathfinder mission to Mars cost one-fifteenth that of the traditionally
managed Viking mission (Ward, 2010). Furthermore, all 16 FBC missions combined
cost less than the Cassini mission to Saturn. For the cost of one traditional NASA
mission, FBC launched ten successful missions and was able to leverage the lessons
learned from an additional six failed missions. “The only real constraint on our activity is
the amount of time and money we can spend. In other words, the important thing is not
how much success we get out of 100 tries, but rather, how much success we get out of
100 dollars” (Ward, 2010:50).
McCurdy observed that failed FBC missions were due to project leaders having
“reduced cost and schedule faster than they lessened complexity” (Ward, 2010:51).
McCurdy concludes, “Engineers and other experts can reduce the cost of spaceflight and
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the time necessary to prepare missions for flight. Moreover, they can do so without
significant loss of reliability. They can also do so with only modest reductions in
spacecraft capability” (Ward, 2010:52).
Successful missions, such as NEAR, used 3-minute meetings and 12-line
schedules. Additionally, many good ideas engineers created were rejected because it
would have increased the schedule, budget, or both. NEAR’s project manager states,
“Had I incorporated even half of these good ideas, the spacecraft would never have been
built. Only those changes that could be made with negligible or minimal disruption were
even considered” (Ward, 2010:52).
Under FBC, NASA “created a cultural framework of principles, priorities, and
values, which shaped their decision-making and guided their organizational behavior”
(Ward, 2010:52). Project managers sought out solutions to problems that allowed them
to maintain schedule and budget while only minimally impacting capability. FIST values
are extremely similar to those found in the FBC initiative and FIST advocates programs
analogous to those under FBC.
The Simplicity Cycle
The concept of Simple and The Simplicity Cycle was first described in a
publication by Ward (2005) however a later, self-published book describes the concept in
greater detail. Ward (2011:8) defines complexity by stating, “Lots of interconnected
parts equal a high degree of complexity. Few interconnected parts equal a low degree of
complexity.” An efficient system should strive to have just the right amount of
interconnected parts so that each component contributes to the overall operation of the
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system. Furthermore, an efficient system operates with as little waste and effort as
possible (Ward, 2011). Figure 1 depicts the Simplicity Cycle. Goodness is depicted on
the horizontal axis and is described as the functionality, utility, and design maturity of the
program. A high level of goodness is the overall goal of the Simplicity Cycle. System
Complexity is on the vertical axis.

Figure 1: The Simplicity Cycle (Ward, 2011)

When development begins, programs are at the origin of the diagram. The first
movement from the origin is towards the middle of the figure where Goodness and
Complexity both increase proportionally. This progress in program development is the
Complexity Slope and “can be described as learning and creating” (Ward, 2011:18). The
middle of the chart is the region of the Complex, in which increasing Complexity no
longer increases Goodness. From this region, only two paths are possible. Continuing to
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the upper right quadrant is unfeasible. “There is a real danger in believing that the upper
right quadrant is either reachable or desirable” (Ward, 2011:38). Eventually, every
system reaches a point where Complexity and Goodness no longer increase
proportionally. At this intersection, managers must decide to simplify and streamline the
existing design, or to continue trying to increase Complexity.
One of the paths from this middle region is the Complication Slope. The
Complication Slope unnecessarily increases the complexity of the system at the cost of
reducing the Goodness. The perceived benefits gained from Complexity are
overshadowed by the problems created. The second path out of the region of Complex is
the Simplification Slope. The Simplification Slope represents the improvement in
Goodness through simplifying the system and reducing the number of interconnected
parts (Ward, 2011). “Complexity in this context is connected to the idea of efficiency.
And a high level of complexity indicates excessive inefficiency” (Ward, 2011:26).
Complexity is necessary and unavoidable in every project. However, what Ward
(2011) refers to as complicatedness should be avoided. Complicatedness is the inclusion
of non-value-added parts that end up weakening the design (Ward, 2011). “Increasing
complexity beyond the degree required to reach the region of the Complex actually
indicates a decrease in understanding design maturity, and functional utility – that is, a
decrease in goodness” (Ward, 2011:30).
At the end of the Simplification Slope, the product has Goodness with the least
Complexity required. However, as time progresses and new technologies, trends, and
threats change, the simple product has less and less Goodness and transitions down the xaxis toward the origin. It is at this point that the Complexity Slope begins again in order
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to improve the product and incorporate new technology. The process of learning on the
Complexity Slope and simplifying on the Simplification Slope resembles a sine wave and
can continue infinitely (Ward, 2011).
The Simplicity Cycle describes the Simple value in FIST. Creating a Simple
weapon system does not mean that the product lacks sophistication, complexity, or
technological advancements. It means that the weapon system is refined, and all the parts
add value to the overall operation of the system.
It’s About Time
In this article, Ward and Quaid (2006) offer a brief history of acquisition timelines
and include examples from various experts to support the position that the DoD
acquisition cycle is too prolonged. In 1986, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
stated, “the most important way technology could enhance our military capability would
be to cut the acquisition cycle time in half” (Ward and Quaid, 2006:14). Development
timelines in the private industry for cars, aircraft, electronics, and spacecraft has
decreased by 50-75 percent due to competition. The Boeing Company cannot afford to
design a new aircraft unless the development time is less than two and half years. While
the development trend in private industry decreases, the same trend in all branches of the
military has increased or remained relatively unchanged (Ward and Quaid, 2006). Figure
2 illustrates this point by comparing the automobile industry’s development timelines to
the branches of the military.
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Figure 2: Average Development Cycle Times (Ward and Quaid, 2006)

The authors state that 90% of the DoD contracts contain no schedule incentive to
finish early. Whether contractors finish a milestone on time or late, there is no impact.
Furthermore, some contractors are even penalized if they submit a proposal that includes
a schedule that finishes early. They are deemed non-responsive bidders. Without
competition and incentives, the development timelines have only increased for the DoD.
McNutt (1998) examined 320 defense projects and concluded that an average defense
project could be completed in 50-65 percent of the scheduled time (Ward and Quaid,
2006).
Ward and Quaid (2006) emphasize that the DoD development time needs to be
completed much faster. Additionally, private industry has been able to achieve shorter
timelines with astonishing results. The authors conclude the article with three
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recommendations. First, an aggressive goal should be set to reduce development time by
50 percent. This reduction can be accomplished by individual project managers or DoDwide. Second, “start generating, collecting, tracking, analyzing, and publishing cycletime metrics. Then discontinue/disallow the practice of dictating schedules” (Ward and
Quaid, 2006:17). Project managers should include schedule incentives in contracts and
seek contractors that set aggressive schedules. Last, personnel in the acquisition system
who are content with the status quo should be removed or retrained. Shortening the
development timeframe may produce new issues, but program timelines should be fixed,
and the resulting problems should be addressed as they arise (Ward and Quaid, 2006:17).
FIST, Part 5
This article concludes Ward and Quaid’s (2006b) five-part series on FIST by
describing the Tiny value. The authors describe the four FIST values as a “collection of
philosophical assertions, designed to drive actions and inform decision-making” (Ward
and Quaid, 2006b:31). To follow the FIST model properly, all aspects of a project need
to be Tiny or no larger than necessary. Schedules, budgets, and complexity should be
minimized. Large program offices, unnecessary paperwork, and complex schedules
hinder programs from achieving Tiny. “Smaller teams are better able to communicate
with internal and external team members… adding more people becomes
counterproductive” (Ward and Quaid, 2006b:32). The F-16 is an example of Tiny in that
the statement of work was 25 pages long, and contractor proposals were limited to 50
pages. The F-16 was completed in half the time and for half the price and size of its
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predecessors. The results are an agile fighter that is operational in 24 different countries,
with over 4,000 aircraft eventually being produced (Ward and Quaid, 2006b).
The authors conclude by stating that customers already desire products that are
faster, cheaper, simpler, and tiny. Such products as cell phones, computers, ATMs, and
fast food are examples of this trend. “Bringing the FIST values to work simply involves
approaching system development and acquisitions the same way we approach other
things in life: with a preference for rapid availability, inexpensive quality, simple
interfaces, and smaller sizes” (Ward and Quaid, 2006b:33).
The Effect of Values on System Development Project Outcomes
In Ward’s (2009) master’s thesis, 22 acquisition projects are investigated for
value clues that suggest if the program incorporated Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, or Tiny
elements of the FIST model. The programs receive a score of 10, 5, 0, or -5 for each of
the four FIST values. Appendix A contains the FIST grading rubric used to score each
program. The most FISTy programs receive a score of 40 and programs that appear to
ignore the FIST model all together, obtain a score of -20. The programs receive an
outcome score of an ‘A’ if the program met or surpassed operational requirements and
delivered an operational capability. The programs receive an ‘F’ if it was cancelled,
rejected by users, or failed to deliver operational capabilities. By comparing the
programs’ FIST score with the actual outcome, Ward (2009) attempts to validate the
FIST model.
The results of Ward’s (2009) analysis are in Appendix B. Six of the 22 programs
have contradicting FIST and outcome scores. The F-20 Tigershark and XP-75 Eagle
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were both high FIST scoring programs that ended up as failures. Conversely, Ward
(2009) indicates that the F-15 Eagle, C-5 Galaxy, V-22 Osprey, and NASA’s Viking
Mission were all low FIST scoring programs. Although these programs were an
operational success, they delivered the system behind schedule and over budget. Cuttingedge technology was preferred over mature, proven technology which led to delays and
cost overruns. While these programs were an operational success, the system
development was far from exemplary. Two of the programs received mediocre scores,
the MRAP at 15 points and the E-3 Sentry at 5 points. The MRAP and E-3 are both
operationally successful but not conclusively FISTy. The remaining 14 programs have
matching FIST and outcome scores (Ward, 2009).
Ward (2009) states that FIST enhances program stability. By being Fast, a
program is completed in a timely manner before new developments in technology,
threats, or changes in the political environment can render the system obsolete. The
system can be developed quickly and avoid costly changes and enhancements that cause
delay and budget overruns. By being Inexpensive, programs reduce the chance of having
funding cut or not secured for future years. Small budget programs are less likely to have
funds relinquished because there are no excess funds in the tight budget. Lastly, keeping
a project Simple by using existing technology enhances the accuracy of the budget and
schedule estimates since new technology, with many unknown factors, is not included in
the program (Ward, 2009).
According to Ward (2009), FIST programs are easier to cancel because they are a
smaller investment with small, streamlined teams. Many programs become so large they
are impossible to cancel. The V-22 Osprey had nearly 2,000 suppliers spread across 40
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states. Furthermore, Congressmen would lose too many constituent jobs if the program
was cancelled. FIST programs, by design, are small in footprint, funding, and personnel.
Ward (2009:86) contends that FIST is a “single idea, with four internally-consistent and
mutually-reinforcing elements, not as a series of independent alternatives for project
leaders to weigh against each other in trade-off analyses.” Project managers should not
focus on picking two elements or sacrificing one value for another. Pick all three FIST
values with Tiny being an inescapable outcome of Fast, Inexpensive, and Simple. By a
project being Simple, it will inherently have a shorter development timeline and lower
costs because risky technology is not being used. On the other hand, achieving a
complex, beyond-state-of-the-art technology may not be attainable with a tight budget
and strict schedule. This is further evidence that FIST is a value set that must be
incorporated as a single idea (Ward, 2009).
The use of mature technology in system development is a significant theme in
FIST literature and for the Simple value. Mature technology can decrease the schedule
and budget through reduced risks and greater understanding of the capability of the
technology. Ward (2009:89) states “mature technology is almost always available, and
project leaders need only resist the temptation to stake their outcome on a hoped-for-butcurrently-unavailable technology.” In support of mature technology, Ward (2009) cites a
1983 Time Magazine article that argues complex weapons cost too much, are
consequently produced in less quantity, and result in questionable effectiveness. The
article continues to state “whether a weapon can be afforded in adequate numbers should
be a more important concern than whether it is state-of-the-art…” (Isaacson, 1983:12).
Technological breakthroughs can rarely be accomplished successfully in the timeframe of
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a project. Project managers should leverage existing scientific discoveries and research
in order to create captivating ways to deliver new capabilities.
There is a significant difference between being Fast, Inexpensive and Simple, and
merely being Hasty, Cheap and Simplistic. Adhering to a project’s schedule or
budget is meaningless if the necessary requirements are not satisfied by the
expenditure, and mature technologies are only good if they perform the required
functions. (Ward, 2009:94)
The FIST literature suggests that failure to understand the FIST values could result in a
failed project. FIST is most successful when done iteratively and risky when used only
once. Ward (2009) lists the following general principles to be used as FIST vectors.
FIST Heuristics (Ward, 2009:102-103)
1. Spending less time gives you more time.
2. To finish early, start early.
3. The tortoise was faster than the hare.
4. The distance between planning and execution should be as short as possible (i.e. if you
wait to the last minute, it only takes a minute – so take the minute now.)
5. If I don’t have enough money, don’t give me more time.
6. The best way to run a program is quickly. (Gregory, 1985:162)
7. The best way to unleash talent is not to have too much of it.
8. Talent trumps process.
9. Generalize the people, specialize the tools (the Batman Principle).
10. You can’t make a discovery according to a schedule.
11. Don’t deal with complexity by adding more complexity. Deal with complexity by
removing it.
12. Worse is better (aka the best is the enemy of the good enough).
13. Theory Y management is simpler than Theory X.
14. Complexity and reliability are inversely proportional.
15. Only ask for one miracle per program. (Rep. Heather Wilson, House Intelligence
Committee)
16. Don’t tinker – it increases complexity, costs time, costs money, introduces instability.
17. Increasing complexity is a cost. (Spinney, 1993:3)
18. Better, faster, cheaper – if you pick two, you’ll only get two.
19. Better, faster, cheaper – pick three.
20. The project leader’s influence over the development is inversely proportional to the
budget and schedule.
21. FIST failures are optimized failures.
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History of AHP
The history of AHP traces back to the 1960’s when founder Thomas Saaty was
overseeing research projects for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the U.S.
Department of State. Thomas Saaty is one of the forerunners of Operations Research and
author of the first Mathematical Methods of Operations Research textbook and the first
queuing textbook (Forman and Gass, 2001:4). During Saaty’s tenure at the U.S.
Department of State, he was afforded a generous budget that allowed him to be able to
recruit a talented team of some of the world’s leading economists and game and utility
theorists. However, Saaty (1996) was disappointed with the results produced by the
team, stating:
Two things stand out in my mind from that experience. The first is that the
theories and models of the scientists were often too general and abstract to be
adaptable to particular weapon tradeoff needs. It was difficult for those who
prepared the U.S. position to include their diverse concerns… and to come up
with practical and sharp answers. The second is that the U.S. position was
prepared by lawyers who had a great understanding of legal matters, but were not
better than the scientists in accessing the value of the weapon systems to be traded
off.
Years later at the Wharton School, Saaty (1987) recognized the absence of a practical
systematic approach to decision-making and priority setting. From 1971 to 1975, Saaty
(1987) developed AHP as a solution to help ordinary people solve complex decisions.
Since then, AHP has received widespread acceptance in the U.S. and throughout the
world. Some of the world’s leading information technology companies as well as the
American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) have implemented AHP as the
“standard practice for multiattribute decision analysis” (Forman and Gass, 2001:5).
Furthermore, AHP has been utilized extensively in numerous universities and in the
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Central Intelligence Agency. “The best way we can describe AHP is to describe its three
basic functions: (1) structuring complexity, (2) measuring on a ratio scale, and (3)
synthesizing” (Forman and Gass, 2001:4).
A Hybrid Approach to Screen Weapon Systems Projects
Greiner et al. discuss the topic of the U.S. DoD making informed decisions about
converting resources and development proposals into fielded weapon systems. Past
research has shown that the DoD has screened, evaluated, selected, and allocated
resources for programs while not taking advantage of available structured decision
methodology. The authors investigate using a hybrid decision support methodology
which integrates AHP with a 0-1 integer portfolio optimization modeling for screening
weapon systems in development.
Their methodology uses a mathematical model created by combining AHP with
integer programming to optimize a portfolio of defense programs. While AHP is a standalone technique that derives an overall priority for the alternatives, it cannot, however,
optimize the selection of projects in light of budget, resource, technology, and other
constraints. Integer programming is utilized to provide this optimization capability to the
model. This model is applied to 15 historical developmental programs with six
independent Air Force personnel acting as evaluators (Greiner et al., 2003).
The model provides each of the 15 programs a fully fund or do not fund status.
Three overall funding solutions are developed by the model. The original Air Force
solution to the portfolio is used as a baseline for comparing new solutions. Each solution
is judged based on how many programs are able to be funded with higher priority
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programs being valued higher. The three new solutions each surpass the original Air
Force solution by using less funding and having a greater overall portfolio value. The
hybrid optimized solution has a 51.1% improvement over the Air Force solution (Greiner
et al., 2003:198-200). These results demonstrate that the AHP model can be used to
reduce program costs and fund more valuable programs to the war-fighter.
The “Real” Success Factors on Projects
A comprehensive answer to which factors lead to project success has been
researched since at least the late 1960s. A successful project can be interpreted in a
variety of ways. Project success is defined as the project outcomes measured against the
overall objectives of the project (Cooke-Davies, 2002). Project success focuses on
whether the project met the stakeholders’ vision, needs, and capability requirements
(Cooke-Davies, 2002). Project management success is calculated against the traditional
performance measures of cost, time, and quality (Cooke-Davies, 2002). Success factors
are inputs into the management system that produce successful projects either directly or
indirectly (Cooke-Davies, 2002). FIST judges programs based on their project
management success. The FIST framework proposes that through rapid project
management success, project success will follow.
Cooke-Davies (2002) analyzed 136 European projects to develop critical factors
to project success. Some of the prominent factors are maintaining a 3-year or less
development timeline and “allow changes to scope only through a mature scope change
control process” (Cooke-Davies, 2002:186). Additionally, organizations should align
their decision-making and strategy with the current projects being developed. This idea
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shows that rapid acquisition organizations need to be structured in a way that enables
rapid development.
Cooke-Davies (2002) found that comparing project performance to the budget
was a better measure of success than comparing it to the schedule. Furthermore,
delivering project success is harder than achieving project management success because
program management delivers only a product or service and it is left to operations
management to optimize the benefits derived from the product. Project success cannot be
measured until after project completion. However, project management performance can
be measured throughout the life of the project.
The article concludes that research and development (R&D) projects should
maximize the return on R&D by improving the time to market. Releasing a new R&D
product as soon as possible keeps the technology relevant and in a competitive position
(Cooke-Davies, 2002).
Expedited Systems Engineering for Rapid Capability and Urgent Needs
Lepore et al (2012). conducted interviews with over 30 individuals and
organizations, in both the DoD and civilian sectors, with experience in rapid
development. The goal of the research is to identify factors that contribute positively to
rapid acquisition outcomes. “One can hypothesize that certain critical success factors
from those organizations that do rapid acquisition may well be transferrable to traditional
acquisition” (Lepore et al., 2012:3). This hypothesis is similar to the FIST concept. The
research team found that 11 observations emerged from the interviews. These
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observations are integrated with current best practices to produce a proposed rapid
acquisitions framework (Lepore et al., 2012).
• Use Mature Technology – Focus on the State of the Possible
• Incremental Deployment (Development) is Part of the Product Plan
• Strive for a Defined Set of Stable Requirements Focused on Warfighter Needs
• Work to Exploit Maximum Flexibility Allowed
• Designing out All Risk Takes Forever…Accept Some Risk
• Keep an Eye on “Normalization”
• Build and Maintain Trust
• Populate Your Team with Specific Skills and Experience
• Maintain High Levels of Motivation and Expectations
• The Government Team Leads the Way
• Right-size the Program - Eliminate or Reduce Major Program Oversight

Many of these observations are similar to the principles found in FIST. However, many
findings are missing from the FIST framework. Incremental development is a key
concept in this article. This tool, also referred to as Generational Development,
intentionally plans for future technology advancements to be incorporated into the
system. Incremental development provides faster upgrade possibilities, extended system
lifespan, and the flexibility to change to a dynamic operational environment (Lepore et
al., 2012).
Another seemingly absent area in FIST is a thorough requirements gathering
activity. Lepore et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of stable, capability-based
requirements, generated in face-to-face meetings with the customer, early in the process.
Then, project teams must fight possible scope creep and additional requirements to
maintain the rapid development timeline (Lepore et al., 2012). Next, the authors observe
that in rapid acquisitions, it is often impossible to provide the user with a 100% solution
to meet their needs. Often customers’ capability requirements will be met with a 23% to
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80% solution (Lepore et al., 2012). The last prominent observation in relation to FIST is
the concept of ambidextrous organizations. This dual structured organization has an
exploring team that generates new technologies and an exploiting team which focuses on
efficiently executing a program using program management techniques (Lepore et al.,
2012).
Summary
The DoD acquisition processes is too lengthy, costs too much, and develops
overtly complex technologies (Blue Ribbon, 1986). A proposed solution named FIST has
been developed and published through a series of articles. The FIST literature uses
historical examples of weapon system programs that illustrate the FIST values and how
they can lead to successful project development.
The computer, airline, and electronic industries have been forced to shorten their
development times by 50-75 percent in the last 50 years to remain competitive. Over the
same timeframe, the average development times for the military have increased or
remained the same (Ward and Quaid, 2006b). Currently, military development length is
four times that of the automotive industry. The private industry has pioneered the
movement of shortening development times while maintaining project success.
The literature and historical examples suggest that large budgets are not necessary
for technological advancements. Having an Inexpensive project can compel project
managers to be resourceful and innovative by working within the confines of their
budget. Furthermore, inexpensive projects often develop simple technology because
expensive, drawn-out testing cannot be financed. Simple technology can be fielded and
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receive feedback more rapidly. Complex and expensive technology may never be
released to the field due to an overwhelmingly long development process required to
produce state-of-the-art technology. Ward (2011) attempted to show through The
Simplicity Cycle that project development reaches a certain point where adding
complexity to a system reduces the overall goodness and functionality of the end-product.
The last FIST value of Tiny is an inescapable result of the first three values. To honor the
first three values, Tiny must be incorporated throughout the program, generating smaller
development teams, schedules, and reducing unnecessary paperwork.
AHP is a proven decision-making tool that has been used in a wide variety of
fields. It has already been employed to create criteria weights for a portfolio of
development projects that require a funding decision. There are additional factors outside
of cost, schedule, and quality that have an impact on project success. Understanding
these factors can be used to improve the FIST model.
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III. Methodology
The methodology used to subject the FIST model to a theory-testing empirical
study will be the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). The development of the theorytesting model is directly influenced by Ward’s (2009) FIST thesis rubric and FIST values.
Criteria weights for the model are derived from an experiment that is completed by
civilian and military program managers. The results of the experiment are used to show
which activities different groups of project managers value. The AHP model results
produce a rank order of the programs from most successful to least successful based on
the criteria and weights in the AHP model. The AHP results can then be compared to the
FIST results, as well as the actual outcomes of the programs. A comparison of this data
highlights the strengths, weaknesses, repeatability, and validity of the FIST model. The
outcome of this research provides recommended changes and future applications of the
FIST model.
Ward’s (2009) FIST methodology is first examined in this chapter to create a
better understanding of this research’s chosen approach. Once the weaknesses to the
FIST methodology are explained, the process of creating an AHP model is described.
Next, the empirical steps used to produce the FIST-AHP model and the alternatives
analysis is explained. The last section of this chapter is devoted to the participants that
comprise this research.
FIST Methodology
The FIST methodology is a combination of reflective practice and case study
research. Ward (2009:4) describes reflective practice as the “examination of one’s
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experiences combined with formal academic knowledge in order to establish deeper
understanding of the practice in question.” This means that much of the FIST framework
was developed from anecdotal personal experience and observations. “The initial FIST
research clearly belongs in the realm of reflective practice, since its foundation largely
rests on ‘knowing-in-practice,’ and was bolstered by, rather than established on,
academic oriented studies” (Ward, 2009:4). While Ward (2009) was initially
commended and labeled a Reflective Practitioner by Dr. Alexander Laufer of Israel’s
Technion University, this methodology has been scrutinized as being too subjective to
one person’s interpretation of case studies and personal experiences.
Ward’s use of quotations and interviews were manipulated by interpretation and
used to fit into the FIST model. Although, some statements and quotes that were
on target with the concept values that FIST conveys Ward choose wisely to sculpt
other phrases and statements to make a direct tie to aspects of FIST, which were
clearly not directly specified or intended for it. (Tran and Ocampo, 2012:8-9)

Much of the case study research methodology is based on Eisenhardt’s (1989) research,
in which the process for building a theory based on case studies is explained. This
research includes selecting “cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent
theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989:537). Eisenhardt (1989) also advocates the use of multiple
investigators, which Ward (2009) uses to a small extent in the analysis. Ward (2009)
chose to have only six of the 22 case studies investigated by an independent party. He
states the benefits to case study research include its replication because the grading rubric
and case study information is available to other researchers. However, four of the six coevaluators produced different scores from the case studies. The E-3 Sentry case study, in
which Ward (2009) gave the program an overall low score of 5, received a high score of
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25 from the co-evaluator. These differing results were not examined in the thesis and
only provided as reference in his appendices. The co-evaluator rankings are in Table 1.

Table 1: Co-Evaluator FIST Rankings
ALTERNATIVES
NASA Pathfinder Mission - Ward
Co-Evaluator
F-16 Falcon - Ward
Co-Evaluator
NASA NEAR Mission - Ward
Co-Evaluator
F-20 Tigershark - Ward
Co-Evaluator
E-3 Sentry (AWACS) - Ward
Co-Evaluator
F-15 Eagle - Ward
Co-Evaluator

F

I

S

T

10
5
10
10
10
10
5
0
5
10
-5
n/a

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
0
10
-5
0

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
0
5
-5
0

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
0
0
-5
0

TOTAL OUTCOME
40
35
40
40
40
40
35
30
5
25
-20
0

A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
A
A
A
A

Ward (2009) uses the strengths of case study research to support his methodology.
However, the weaknesses of this methodology are not addressed in his thesis. The
strengths of case study research are described by Eisenhardt (1989) as being able to
create a novel theory from insights that arise from contradicting evidence. Furthermore,
the emerging theory is likely to be testable because the concepts can easily be measured
and hypothesized (Eisenhardt, 1989). Lastly, “The likelihood of a valid theory is high
because the theory-building process is so intimately tied with evidence that is very likely
that the resultant theory will be consistent with empirical observation” (Eisenhardt,
1989:547). This strength leads directly into a weakness of case study methodology.
Eisenhardt (1989) states that a resultant theory, built-off case studies, is likely to
be empirically valid. However, FIST lacks empirical studies. FIST’s scientific basis is
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tenuous without additional empirically based studies to support the theory. To truly
validate FIST as an applicable rapid acquisition approach, numerous quantitative, theorytesting studies are required.
Such theories are likely to be testable, novel, and empirically valid, but they do
lack the sweep of theories… They are essentially theories about specific
phenomena… ultimately they are not theories about organization in any grand
sense. Perhaps ‘grand’ theory requires multiple studies – an accumulation of both
theory-building and theory-testing empirical studies. (Eisenhardt, 1989:547)
Theory-building from case studies also risks the phenomenon of not being able to rise to
a level generality. In other words, such theories are only valid for small subset of the
population. The resultant theories can be narrow and idiosyncratic (Eisenhardt, 1989).
With only 22 programs analyzed by Ward (2009), there is a great possibility that FIST
has limited usage.
The AHP Process
Saaty (1990) developed AHP as a multi-criteria decision-making approach. AHP
is a decision support tool that can solve complex decision problems with numerous
criteria. AHP permits decision-makers to model intricate problems as a hierarchical
structure that shows the relationship between the goal, primary criteria, sub-criteria, and
alternatives. The application of AHP includes studies in project management,
environmental policy, information systems, risk assessment, and project screening
(Greiner et al., 2003). AHP is an appropriate methodology for insight into FIST because
AHP can integrate quantitative and qualitative criteria into the decision-making process.
The decision-makers’ input is vital to accurate model creation.
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The first step in AHP is to define the objective or goal of the model. Next, the
alternatives, primary criteria, and sub-criteria are established. The criteria should be
chosen to “represent the problem as thoroughly as possible, but not so thoroughly as to
lose sensitivity to change in the elements” (Saaty, 1990:9). Decision-makers can
visualize an overall assessment of the complex relationships that compose a problem by
arranging the goals and criteria of a problem into a hierarchy structure. Furthermore,
decision-makers can compare the criteria at each level of the hierarchy to make sure they
are the same order of magnitude. “A decision-maker can insert or eliminate levels and
elements as necessary to clarify the task of setting priorities or to sharpen the focus on
one of more parts of the system” (Saaty, 1990:9). As seen in Figure 3, the decisionmakers decompose the problem into a decision hierarchy starting with the goal through
the criteria, sub-criteria, and alternatives at the lowest level.

Figure 3: Decision making as a Hierarchical Structure (Yau, 2009)
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Saaty (1990:12) states the “most effective way to concentrate judgments is to take
a pair of elements [criteria] and compare them on a single property without concern for
other properties or other elements.” This is the second step of AHP in which decisionmakers use pairwise comparisons of second level criteria to determine criteria weights.
The comparisons are accomplished by judging which criterion is more beneficial to the
overall goal of the system. Pairwise comparisons are completed for the primary decision
criteria by comparing two criteria at a time, based on their importance to the overall goal.
Values of one through nine and their reciprocals are given to each pairwise comparison.
Table 2 provides an explanation of the values.

Table 2: The Fundamental Scale (Saaty, 1990:15)
Intensity of Importance
on an Absolute Scale

Definition

1

Equal Importance

3

Moderate importance of one over another

5

Essential or strong importance

7

Very strong importance

9

Extreme importance

2,4,6,8
Reciprocals

Rationals

Intermediate values between the two adjacent judgments

Explanation
Two activities contribute equally
to the objective
Experience and judgment
strongly favor one activity over
another
Experience
and judgment
strongly favor one activity over
An activity is strongly favored and
its dominance demonstrated in
The evidence favoring one
activity over another is of the
When compromise is needed

If activity i has one of the above numbers assigned to it
when compared with activity j, then j has the reciprocal
value when compared with i
If consistency were to be forced
by obtaining n numerical values
to span the matrix

Ratios arising from the scale

Once the pairwise comparisons are completed, a judgment matrix for each level
of the hierarchy will be created. Figure 4 depicts a judgment matrix for weights (W) and
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(n) number of decision criteria (C). Each W in the matrix represents the fundamental
scale value associated with the pairwise comparison of the two criteria. To calculate the
weights of each criterion, the maximum left eigenvector is approximated by multiplying
the elements in each row with each other and then taking the nth root. These values are
normalized by dividing the value by their sum to produce the final priority vector, or
weight, of each criterion (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995).

Figure 4: Judgment Matrix

The judgment matrix must be consistent, in that A12 = A13 × A32. The consistency
of the matrix is calculated through the consistency ratio (CR). A judgment matrix is
considered adequate if the corresponding CR is less than 10%. To establish the CR, first
the maximum eigenvalue (max) must be calculated by summing each column of the
judgment matrix and multiplying that value by the vector weight. Then the consistency
index (CI) is calculated using the formula:
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(1)

Last, the CR is determined by dividing the CI by the Random Consistency index (RCI)
that is provided in Table 3 (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995).

Table 3: RCI Values for Different Values of n (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995:5)

At this point, all the criteria and sub-criteria have priority vectors. The
alternatives now need to be analyzed using the established framework. If a problem has
N number of criteria and M alternatives, the decision-maker must now create N judgment
matrices. This produces one matrix per criteria in order to compare all alternatives
against each other based on the lowest-level criteria. The same pairwise comparison
process is completed to derive priority vectors for each alternative under each criterion.
Figure 5 shows the final decision matrix. Value a11 in the decision matrix represents the
priority vector for alternative one (A1) under criteria one (C1) (Triantaphyllou and Mann,
1995). Wn represents the weight of each criterion as established in step two of the
process.

Figure 5: Decision Matrix (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995)
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The final priority of the alternatives is denoted as AiAHP and is calculated by the
following formula (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995:2):

(2)

This formula establishes the final weight through the summation of the alternatives’
priority vector (aij), multiplied by that criteria’s weight (wj).
The FIST-AHP Model
Ward (2009) uses 18 activities in the FIST rubric to score acquisition programs.
These 18 activities are used to create the hierarchical structure in Figure 6. More
information is available about the FIST rubric in Appendix A.

Figure 6: FIST Hierarchal Structure
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To calculate the weights of both the FIST values and the FIST sub-criteria
activities, an experiment is used to survey participants for pairwise comparisons between
all the FIST values and FIST activities using the fundamental scale. Participants’
answers are recorded in Microsoft Excel and transferred into Expert Choice TM for
analysis. Appendix C contains the directions of the experiment while Appendix D and E
show a sample of the actual experiment. Appendix D asks participants to compare the
FIST values of Fast, Inexpensive, Simple and Tiny. Since most participants are unaware
of the FIST model, definitions of each value, based on Ward’s (2009) thesis, are provided
in this section of the experiment. Participants will make high-level judgments based on
which FIST values they deemed most important to successful project development. The
outcome of this section of the experiment produces the weights for each of the four FIST
values. More information on participants is found in a forthcoming section.
Additional demographic information was gathered in the experiment such as the
number of years’ experience in project management, if the participant has official
leadership experience, and the participants’ highest rank obtained while in project
management. This demographic information was used to divide participants into the
following groups: All Participants, Leaders, Non-Leaders, Military, Civilian, Consistent
Responses, and Expert Responses. Consistent responses are determined if the resulting
consistency ratio (CR) of the judgment matrix is less than 10%. Experts were segregated
from the population if they had more than 15 years of experience in project management
or an advanced academic degree directly related to project management. The variations
in organizational values between military and civilian, leaders and non-leaders, as well as
experts to all others, will come to light through the analysis of the data. Civilian project
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management firms must not only be successful in project management but also be able to
create profit, otherwise the company would be bankrupt. Gaining insight from this
population of successful project managers will be invaluable to improving the DoD
acquisitions and analyzing the FIST model.
The next section of the experiment is described in Appendix E. It combines all 18
activities in Ward’s (2009) FIST rubric. The activities were presented in a randomly
assorted order so that it was not easily discernible which activity was related to each
FIST value. Furthermore, participants were not informed that the activities were related
to the FIST values in the first section of the experiment. This was purposely designed to
prevent participants from attempting to judge the 18 activities artificially more or less
significant to match their answers in the first section. The answers to this second section
serve two purposes. First, the pairwise comparisons form the weight of each subcriterion for the model. Second, the internal reliability of the FIST model can be
analyzed. If the FIST model is consistent, then the summation of the activities under
each FIST value should match the rankings completed in the first section of the
experiment. For example, if a participant ranked Fast as the most important FIST value
in the first section, then the summation of the five separate Fast activities in part two
should be greater than the summation of activities for Inexpensive, Simple, or Tiny. If
participants deem Fast as the most influential value but then rank the Inexpensive tasks as
the most important group of activities, a disconnect in the model becomes apparent or the
activities are not properly designed to cover the FIST value. A disconnect in FIST values
and activities could lead to recommendations to change, remove, or add activities to
better encompass the FIST values.
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Once all the pairwise comparisons for the FIST values and FIST activities were
collected from the participants, the data was inputted into the software program called
Expert Choice TM. Expert Choice TM uses AHP to allow the decision-maker to
decompose the problem into a hierarchy of criteria and sub-criteria. In this case, the
criteria are the four FIST values and the sub-criteria are the 18 FIST activities. The
decision-maker then inputs the pairwise comparison judgments into the program to arrive
at overall weights for the criteria. The participants’ responses to the experiment create
the weights for the criteria and sub-criteria. By selecting certain participants’ responses
to be included in a model, it is possible to create seven different models that are not
mutually exclusive to represent All Participants, Leaders, Non-Leaders, Military,
Civilian, Consistent Responses, and Experts. Once the models were created, an
alternatives analysis was conducted and the subsequent judgments were placed into
Expert Choice TM to be evaluated by the different models.
It was not possible to have participants become familiar enough with each
alternative to be able to pass proper judgments on programs and make comparisons.
However, participants’ opinions were used for the criteria because they were basing their
judgments on experience in project management. Expert Choice TM is then used to
calculate an overall score for each program. High scores are related to programs that
exhibit FIST qualities and low scores are representative of programs that ignored the
FIST theory of development. Additionally, Expert Choice TM can provide additional
analysis such as sensitivity graphs to help explain the results.
Miller (1956) showed that participants cannot simultaneously compare more than
seven objects, plus or minus two, at one time. Saaty (1990) set the upper limit of
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alternatives in AHP to nine (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995). Taking this upper limit
into account, 11 programs are used as alternatives from Ward’s (2009) 22 original
programs to be analyzed under the AHP model. The reason for increasing the number of
alternatives over the rule of nine is that a large number of alternatives are required to see
if the FIST process is reproducible and to be able to encompass the entire spectrum of
programs. A variety of programs can test if FIST is adequately generalizable to be used
on space, aircraft, and ground vehicle programs. Alternatives were also selected that had
contradicting FIST and real-world scores. These contradicting alternatives can highlight
weaknesses in FIST. Programs that score mediocre on the FIST scale do not strongly
suggest if the mission is a failure or success. These alternatives were chosen to analyze
missions that are only partially FISTy.
The primary researcher selected 11 programs that best covered a variety of
outcomes, FIST scores, and types of programs. Included in the analysis were space
launch, helicopter, fighter aircraft, cargo aircraft, and ground vehicle development
programs. Table 4 shows the missions selected for AHP analysis, the real-world outcome
grade, and the original FIST score from Ward’s (2009) thesis.
Table 4: Missions Analyzed Under AHP Model

MISSION

OUTCOME FIST SCORE

NASA Mars Pathfinder
P-51 Mustang
A-10 Thunderbolt II
F-20 Tigershark
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
MRAP
E-3 Sentry AWACS
NASA Mars Viking Mission
C-5 Galaxy
V-22 Osprey
RAH-66 Comanche

A
A
A
F
F
A
A
A
A
A
F
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40
35
35
35
25
15
5
-10
-15
-20
-20

Alternatives Analysis
Each of the 11 missions was analyzed independently and received a Poor,
Average, Good, or Excellent rating for the 18 FIST activities. The rating was
qualitatively determined by the author on how well the program incorporated the FIST
activity in the program’s development, not necessarily the outcome. This score is
determined through case study analysis. It is worth noting that a mission could receive an
Excellent score for fully incorporating a certain FIST activity even if the outcome from
that activity was negative. Appendix F contains the results of the alternative analysis of
the 11 programs. Once the qualitative score was determined for each program based on
each activity, a quantitative pairwise comparison was completed by using Saaty’s
fundamental scale. This pairwise comparison is then entered into Expert Choice TM.
Expert Choice TM evaluates the data according to the criteria weights of that model. The
output is a rank ordering of mission from most FISTy to least. The alternatives’ pairwise
comparison does not change between models. The only changes that occur between
models are the criteria weights. The weights are reflections of the category of program
manager whose opinion was used in that model.
A large portion of the alternatives analysis builds off the examination already
completed by Ward (2009). Since mission analysis was a significant portion of his thesis,
this analysis chooses to build off his foundation rather than scrutinize his examination. If
Ward (2009) provides evidence that a mission integrated or ignored certain FIST
activities, that proof was used in this analysis. Where evidence was missing or not
mentioned, further research was then conducted into confirming the activity’s presence or
absence in the mission development.
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Participants
As of September 2012, there were 2,258 Air Force officers in the acquisition
career field of project management. To collect a statistically correct sample with a 95%
confidence level with + 10 confidence interval, 92 participants should be surveyed.
However, due to this large number of participants and the length of the experiment, the
experiment was sent to military, government civilian, and civilian project managers to
gain enough of a consensus to be able to draw a conclusion on the FIST model. As
previously stated, this provides the added benefit of gathering data from a diverse
population, thereby adding to the breadth of the analysis. This research was able to
obtain 75 responses, with only 33 participants being active duty Air Force officers. With
33 responses, a confidence interval of + 16.94 at the 95% confidence level is achieved.
One of the civilian project management firms selected for the experiment was
Parsons Brinkerhoff (PB). Twenty-eight civilian participants were surveyed from PB.
PB was founded in New York City in 1885 and today employees 14,000 people in 150
offices on five continents. “Parsons Brinckerhoff is a global consulting firm assisting
public and private clients to plan, develop, design, construct, operate and maintain
thousands of critical infrastructure projects around the world” (Parsons Brinckerhoff,
2012). PB’s projects include infrastructure, transportation, power, energy, community
development, water, mining, and environment. Respondents from PB have managed
such programs as the $2.5 billion Woodrow Wilson Bridge Replacement program and the
$5 billion Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Capital Improvement
Program. “Program management is a partnership with owners that fosters effective,
cost-efficient and innovative project delivery... Program management at Parsons
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Brinckerhoff means working with our clients to anticipate the key issues that could
impact successful completion of not only the individual projects that make up a program,
but the overall program itself” (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2012). Due in part to the immense
project management experience from PB respondents, an expert AHP model was able to
be developed.
Summary
Ward’s (2009) theory-building methodology utilizing reflective practice merged
with case study research has been criticized as being too subjective and lacking theorytesting empirical studies. Grand theories require the accumulation of multiple theorybuilding and theory-testing empirical studies to support the framework and generalize its
use for a wider audience (Eisenhardt, 1989). FIST’s scientific foundation is
unsubstantiated without further empirical based studies.
To summarize the AHP methodology, project managers from across a variety of
disciplines were surveyed to collect their opinions on the FIST values and 18 sub-criteria
activities. Those opinions, or pairwise comparisons, were used to determine criteria
weights in seven different AHP models. Furthermore, those pairwise comparisons were
used to examine the internal reliability of the FIST model itself by comparing FIST
values with FIST activities. Once the AHP models were developed, 11 selected
programs were used as alternatives. The results show a rank order of the 11 programs
from most FISTy to least. From the results, conclusion can be drawn about the reliability,
strengths, and weaknesses of FIST.
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IV. Analysis and Results
As per the approach outlined in the methodology chapter, the results will be
presented and then further separated into seven groups according to participant category:
All Participants, Leaders, Non-Leaders, Military, Civilian, Consistent Responses, and
Experts. Seven Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) models were created, one for each
group, to compare the values of each group of project managers. The only differences
between the models are the criteria weights derived from the different groups of project
managers. The pairwise comparisons for the alternatives remain the same for all models
but the end results will differ due to differences in criteria weights.
The experiment collected 75 responses from project managers. The participants’
identities are anonymous, and any voluntary feedback on the experiment that is used in
this thesis was approved by the participant. Forty participants were civilians with no
military experience, and 35 participants were military project managers ranging in rank
from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel. There were also two government
civilians (GS) in the military group who are project managers that work for the Air Force
as civilians. Forty-three participants had leadership positions in project management, and
32 participants had no leadership experience. CGO is an abbreviation of Company Grade
Officer and represents the ranks of Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, and Captain.
FGO stands for Field Grade Officer and represents the ranks of Major, Lieutenant
Colonel, and Colonel. While the sample of GS and FGOs is too small to interpret, their
inclusion in the various models bolsters the number of participants. To increase the
reliability of the models, more participants are required. Table 5 depicts the number of
participants in each group.
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Table 5: Participants by Model
All

Leader Non-Leader Military Civilian Consistent Expert

Avg. Years of Experience

11.21

14.53

6.94

5.83

15.85

8.41

17.25

CGO
FGO
GS
Civilian
TOTAL

28
5
2
40
75

12
4
1
25
42

16
1
1
15
33

28
5
2
0
35

0
0
0
40
40

14
3
0
11
28

0
3
0
34
37

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

42
33
75

42
0
42

0
33
33

17
18
35

25
15
40

10
18
28

25
12
37

All Participants Results
The All Participants model includes every response to the experiment with no
distinction for military, experience, or consistency of answers. As seen in Table 6, there
were 75 participants with an average of 11.2 years of project management experience.
These 75 responses created the model seen in Table 7. The numbers in the table denote
the priority vector or weight of each criterion.

Table 6: All Participants Model Demographic
DEMOGRAPHICS

Information

Avg. Years of Experience

11.21

CGO
FGO

28
5

GS
Civilian
TOTAL

2
40
75

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

42
33
75
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Table 7: All Participants FIST-AHP Model

FIST-AHP MODEL

All

FAST

0.324

Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

INEXPENSIVE
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

SIMPLE
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent

TINY

0.135
0.249
0.243
0.171
0.202

0.216
0.226
0.211
0.161
0.270
0.132

0.313
0.108
0.186
0.246
0.272
0.188

0.147

Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation

0.293
0.381
0.326

Of the four FIST values, Fast was ranked the highest at 0.324, followed by Simple
(0.313), Inexpensive (0.216), and Tiny (0.147). The sub-criteria activities are only
compared to other activities within the same FIST value. In other words, each Fast
activity is only compared to other Fast activities. The activity weights represent which
activity is deemed most prominent only under that FIST value. A comparison cannot be
made between different FIST sub-criteria activities using this model. For example, one
cannot compare the Fast activity of Formal commitment to maintain deadlines to the
Inexpensive activity of Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost because
the activities are part of different FIST values.
However, in order to be able to compare all the FIST activities to one another,
regardless of FIST value, a sub-criteria model was created. This model is based on
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responses from project managers that compared all the FIST activities to one another
with no distinction for which activities belonged to each FIST value. Table 8 shows a
ranked order of the FIST activities from most valued to least in regard to system
development and project management. The top three activities are Importance of
Simplicity, Importance of Low-Cost, and Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines.
Interestingly, each of these top activities belongs to a different FIST value (Simple,
Inexpensive, and Fast). The least valued activities are Accept Risk to Reduce Cost,
System Capability Less than Previous System, and Importance of Small.

Table 8: All Participants Sub-Criteria Model

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
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All
RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

WEIGHT
0.083
0.081
0.081
0.079
0.077
0.076
0.068
0.065
0.064
0.051
0.043
0.041
0.039
0.037
0.031
0.031
0.027
0.025

Using the model developed in Table 7, the 11 programs were evaluated based on
the 18 sub-criteria activities. Appendix G contains the raw results from Expert Choice
TM

. Table 9 summarizes the results of the All Participants model. The missions are

ranked from most FISTy to least. The Actual Outcome column identifies if the program
was deemed a real world success qualitatively by delivering promised capabilities and
fulfilling program requirements. An outcome score of an ‘A’ signifies a successful
program and an ‘F’ signifies a failure. This score does not take into account if the
program remained on budget or schedule, only if the eventual product was an operational
success.
The FIST Value Ranking column shows a rank order of importance for the FIST
values derived from Table 7. The FIST Combined Activity Ranking column is a
summation of the activities in Table 8, per FIST value. By comparing the FIST Value
Ranking and FIST Combined Activity Ranking columns, one can infer on the internal
validity of the model.

Table 9: All Participants Model Results
All
Alternatives

Actual Outcome Priority Standardized

A-10 Thunderbolt II
NASA Mars Pathfinder
F-20 Tigershark
P-51 Mustang
MRAP
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
E-3 Sentry AWACS
C-5 Galaxy
NASA Mars Viking Mission

A
A
F
A
A
F
A
A
A

0.17
0.169
0.126
0.111
0.109
0.103
0.091
0.07
0.018

1
0.996
0.743
0.655
0.642
0.609
0.537
0.412
0.107

V-22 Osprey
RAH-66 Comanche

A
F

0.017
0.016

0.099
0.093

FIST Value Ranking
FAST
SIMPLE
INEXPENSIVE
TINY
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0.324
0.313
0.216
0.147

FIST Combined Activity Ranking
FAST
SIMPLE
INEXPENSIVE
TINY

0.307
0.304
0.281
0.107

In this model, the A-10 Thunderbolt II and NASA Mars Pathfinder mission were
the highest ranked programs. This shows that these programs were the most FISTy in
their development. The A-10 and Mars Pathfinder were also deemed a success
operationally. The V-22 Osprey and RAH-66 Comanche had exceedingly low scores
because their development was lengthy, expensive, and complicated. The V-22 was
considered an operational success despite its poor development whereas the RAH-66 was
a total failure by not delivering a single aircraft. It is worth noting that the F-20
Tigershark and XP-75 Eagle received high FIST scores while being considered failures
operationally. This disconnect will be further examined in Chapter V. This model has
matching internal validity as participants ranked the FIST values and FIST activities in
the same order of importance.
Leaders Results
This model includes all the respondents who stated they have leadership positions
in the project management field. This model contains both military and civilian leaders
and will serve as a basis of comparison against the Non-Leader model. By observing the
difference in the values, conclusions can be drawn as to whether project managers are
using the same vision as the leaders. The difference in values could account for some
project management failures. As shown in Table 10, there were 42 participants in this
model with an average of 14.5 years of experience.
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Table 10: Leader Model Demographic Information
LEADER DEMOGRAPHICS
Avg. Years of Experience

14.53

CGO
FGO

12
4

GS
Civilian
TOTAL

1
25
42

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

42
0
42

Table 11 displays the weights derived from the leaders’ input. Leaders’
emphasized the importance of Fast and Simple values and placed low prominence on
Tiny. Tiny seems to be a low ranked FIST value because many projects are not supposed
to be small such as cargo aircraft, bridges, or highway systems. Based on feedback from
project managers, the Tiny concept was understood as maintaining a small team and
minimal documentation. Nevertheless, leaders did not rank Tiny as a highly important
value.
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Table 11: Leader FIST-AHP Model

FIST-AHP MODEL

Leader

FAST

0.337

Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

INEXPENSIVE
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

SIMPLE
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent

TINY
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation

0.151
0.277
0.210
0.161
0.201

0.208
0.252
0.192
0.161
0.251
0.144

0.290
0.125
0.169
0.250
0.270
0.187

0.165
0.301
0.374
0.325

The sub-criteria model, shown in Table 12, allows all the FIST activities to be
compared to each other. Leaders deemed Formal commitments to maintain deadlines
and budget as the most important activities in the FIST framework.
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Table 12: Leaders Sub-Criteria Model
Leader

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)

RANK WEIGHT
1
0.090
2
0.077
3
0.069
3
0.069
3
0.069
4
0.068
5
0.062
6
0.061
7
0.052
8
0.051
10
0.049
9
0.049
11
0.045
12
0.044
13
0.040
14
0.040
15
0.036
16
0.029

Table 13 summarizes the results of the Leaders Model. The shaded cells in the
FIST Value Rankings and FIST Combined Activity Rankings columns represent
inconsistencies in this model. The leaders ranked Simple as the second most influential
FIST value. However, the summation of all the FIST activities shows leaders place more
importance on Inexpensive activities rather than Simple activities. With the project
managers being leaders in this model, it is not surprising that they ranked individual
budget activities high. There are minimal differences between this model and the All
Participants model results.
Table 13: Leaders Model Results
Leader
Alternatives
Actual Outcome
NASA Mars Pathfinder
A
A-10 Thunderbolt II
A
F-20 Tigershark
F
P-51 Mustang
A
MRAP
A
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
F
E-3 Sentry AWACS
A
C-5 Galaxy
A
NASA Mars Viking Mission
A
V-22 Osprey
A
RAH-66 Comanche
F

Priority Standardized
FIST Value Ranking
0.17
1
FAST
0.337
0.17
0.999
SIMPLE
0.29
0.126
0.74
INEXPENSIVE
0.208
0.113
0.662
TINY
0.165
0.11
0.646
0.1
0.588
0.091
0.537
0.069
0.407
0.018
0.108
0.017
0.099
0.016
0.093
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FIST Combined Activity Ranking
FAST
0.329
INEXPENSIVE
0.298
SIMPLE
0.252
TINY
0.121

Non-Leaders Results
The Non-Leader model consists of 33 participants who answered they had no
leadership experience in project management. With an average of 6.9 years of
experience, this model is almost half military and half civilian. The purpose of this
model is to capture the opinion of the project managers who oversee the daily activities
of a project. These are the frontline project managers who interpret and execute the
strategic direction of leadership into managing the project. Table 14 summarizes the
participants who were used in creating this model.
Table 14: Non-Leader Model Demographic Information
NON-LEADER DEMOGRAPHICS
Avg. Years of Experience

6.94

CGO
FGO

16
1

GS
Civilian
TOTAL

1
15
33

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

0
33
33

Table 15 displays the Non-Leader model weights for each FIST value and
activity. Simple was the most important FIST value in this model followed by Fast. This
differs from that of the leadership model where Fast is the highest ranked value.
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Table 15: Non-Leader FIST-AHP Model
FIST-AHP MODEL

Non-Leader

FAST

0.305

Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

INEXPENSIVE
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

SIMPLE
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent

TINY

0.114
0.209
0.294
0.184
0.200

0.225
0.192
0.237
0.159
0.259
0.115

0.346
0.088
0.212
0.239
0.270
0.189

0.124

Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation

0.281
0.392
0.326

Table 16 depicts a rank order of which FIST sub-criteria activities Non-Leaders
considered most valuable. These results are consistent with the previous models’ results.

Table 16: Non-Leaders Sub-Criteria Model
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
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Non-Leader
RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
7
8
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
14
15

WEIGHT
0.084
0.082
0.080
0.074
0.072
0.065
0.065
0.064
0.057
0.057
0.052
0.047
0.042
0.037
0.034
0.031
0.031
0.026

Table 17 provides a summary of the results for this model. The Non-Leader
model was consistent in that participants’ judgments on the FIST values matched those of
the FIST activities.

Table 17: Non-Leaders Model Results
Non-Leader
Alternatives
Actual Outcome
A-10 Thunderbolt II
A
NASA Mars Pathfinder
A
F-20 Tigershark
F
P-51 Mustang
A
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
F
MRAP
A
E-3 Sentry AWACS
A
C-5 Galaxy
A
NASA Mars Viking Mission
A
V-22 Osprey
A
RAH-66 Comanche
F

Priority
0.169
0.168
0.127
0.109
0.108
0.107
0.091
0.07
0.018
0.017
0.016

Standardized
1
0.991
0.75
0.645
0.637
0.633
0.539
0.416
0.104
0.098
0.094

FIST Value Ranking
SIMPLE
0.346
FAST
0.305
INEXPENSIVE
0.225
TINY
0.124

FIST Combined Activity Ranking
SIMPLE
0.311
FAST
0.299
INEXPENSIVE
0.275
TINY
0.115

There are minimal differences in this model’s rankings of alternatives compared
to the previous models. Specifically, the MRAP was ranked sixth in this model and the
XP-75 Eagle was ranked fifth. Most models reversed this ranking with the MRAP being
ranked higher than the XP-75. Lastly, this is the first model to rank both the Simple value
and combined Simple activities as most important.
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Military Results
The Military model consists of only military officers and government civilian
project managers. Their experience in project management is shaped by DoD policy and
government programs. This model was used as a basis of comparison against the
Civilian model in order to discern if the military was ignoring any private industry
practices in project management. These project managers have an average of 5.8 years of
experience, which is the least experience of all the models. Almost half of this model’s
participants are leaders, but the vast majority are young CGOs. Table 18 summarizes the
participants for this model.
Table 18: Military Model Demographic Information

MILITARY DEMOGRAPHICS
Avg. Years of Experience

5.83

CGO
FGO

28
5

GS
Civilian
TOTAL

2
0
35

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

17
18
35

The FIST-AHP model is shown in Table 19. Simple and Fast are the highest
ranked FIST values, with Simple marginally more important. Tiny is by far the least
significant value to this group of project managers.
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Table 19: Military FIST-AHP Model

FIST-AHP MODEL

Military

FAST

0.325

Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

INEXPENSIVE
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

SIMPLE
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent

TINY

0.129
0.190
0.290
0.169
0.221

0.232
0.190
0.255
0.157
0.276
0.123

0.327
0.105
0.224
0.257
0.272
0.142

0.115

Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation

0.276
0.397
0.327

Table 20 shows a rank order of the FIST activities that military project
managers’ value. Military project managers find it important to be proactive in reducing
both development time and cost. Furthermore, low-cost solutions are a highly ranked
activity. Further differences between military and civilian project management values
will be explored in Chapter V.
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Table 20: Military Sub-Criteria Model

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)

Military
RANK WEIGHT
1
0.083
2
0.082
3
0.075
4
0.074
5
0.073
5
0.073
6
0.068
8
0.062
7
0.062
9
0.053
10
0.051
11
0.042
11
0.042
12
0.038
13
0.037
14
0.031
15
0.027
16
0.026

The results of the military model are summarized in Table 21. The shaded cells
represent disconnects between FIST values and FIST activities. For example, the
military valued Simple (0.327) as the highest FIST value but the combination of the five
Simple activities (0.279) ranked third in the sub-criteria model. This could be due to
Simple and Fast being closely ranked in the FIST-AHP model. Moreover, combining
military leaders and non-leaders may have disrupted the consistency of this model.
The Military model ranked the XP-75 Eagle fourth. This is the highest this
program was ranked in any of the models. This failed WWII fighter aircraft outranked
the successful P-51 Mustang.

63

Table 21: Military Model Results
Military
Alternatives
Actual Outcome
A-10 Thunderbolt II
A
NASA Mars Pathfinder
A
F-20 Tigershark
F
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
F
P-51 Mustang
A
MRAP
A
E-3 Sentry AWACS
A
C-5 Galaxy
A
NASA Mars Viking Mission
A
V-22 Osprey
A
RAH-66 Comanche
F

Priority Standardized
FIST Value Ranking
0.17
1
SIMPLE
0.327
0.166
0.976
FAST
0.325
0.123
0.722
INEXPENSIVE
0.232
0.112
0.657
TINY
0.115
0.109
0.642
0.108
0.631
0.094
0.55
0.068
0.397
0.018
0.103
0.017
0.097
0.016
0.093

FIST Combined Activity Ranking
FAST
0.311
INEXPENSIVE
0.31
SIMPLE
0.279
TINY
0.099

Civilian Model Results
This population of participants was selected from private industry companies
specializing in the project management profession. These project managers have
completed such projects as hospitals, highway systems, and bridges. Since most project
managers in these companies started out as engineers and became project managers as
they advanced and gained knowledge, this model has an average of 15.9 years of project
management experience. The civilian project managers do not have any experience with
DoD projects, and their experience is acquired from profit and performance driven goals.
Not only must these project managers ensure the project reaches completion with the
desired capabilities, but they must earn a profit. Therefore, these project managers are
particularly concerned with maintaining the schedule and budget. Table 22 summarizes
the demographics of the civilian participants.
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Table 22: Civilian Model Demographic Information

CIVILIAN DEMOGRAPHICS
Avg. Years of Experience

15.85

CGO
FGO

0
0

GS
Civilian
TOTAL

0
40
40

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

25
15
40

The Civilian model is summarized in Table 23. Civilian project managers ranked
Fast as the highest FIST value followed by Simple and Inexpensive. The Civilian model
is similar to the All Participants and Leader models.

Table 23: Civilian FIST-AHP Model

FIST-AHP MODEL

Civilian

FAST

0.321

Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

INEXPENSIVE
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

SIMPLE
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent

TINY
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
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0.138
0.308
0.205
0.169
0.181

0.200
0.260
0.177
0.163
0.262
0.138

0.298
0.110
0.155
0.231
0.267
0.237

0.181
0.308
0.368
0.324

Table 24 depicts the FIST activities in order of importance judged by civilian
project managers. One point of interest is that civilians ranked accepting risk as low in
importance. Furthermore, the civilians ranked Emphasis on the importance of and
reliance on employees’ talent higher than any other model.

Table 24: Civilian Sub-Criteria Model

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)

Civilian
RANK WEIGHT
1
0.097
2
0.075
3
0.074
4
0.070
5
0.069
6
0.067
7
0.063
8
0.058
9
0.052
10
0.050
11
0.048
12
0.047
13
0.043
14
0.042
14
0.042
15
0.041
16
0.034
17
0.028

The results from the Civilian model are presented in Table 25. There is only a
slight inconsistency between the FIST values and FIST activities of Simple and
Inexpensive. The alternatives rankings are similar to previous models with no
noteworthy differences.
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Table 25: Civilian Model Results
Civilian
Alternatives
Actual Outcome
NASA Mars Pathfinder
A
A-10 Thunderbolt II
A
F-20 Tigershark
F
P-51 Mustang
A
MRAP
A
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
F
E-3 Sentry AWACS
A
C-5 Galaxy
A
NASA Mars Viking Mission
A
V-22 Osprey
A
RAH-66 Comanche
F

Priority
0.172
0.169
0.13
0.113
0.11
0.095
0.089
0.072
0.019
0.017
0.016

Standardized
1
0.983
0.755
0.657
0.64
0.554
0.519
0.417
0.109
0.099
0.092

FIST Value Ranking
FAST
0.321
SIMPLE
0.298
INEXPENSIVE
0.2
TINY
0.181

FIST Combined Activity Ranking
FAST
0.321
INEXPENSIVE
0.272
SIMPLE
0.271
TINY
0.136

Consistent Response Results
The Consistent model was developed due to the AHP principle that judgment
matrices are only considered adequate if the consistency ratio (CR) is less than 10%.
Expert Choice TM software calculates the CR for both the FIST value experiment and the
FIST sub-criteria activities experiment. Almost all participants had valid FIST value CRs
because there are only six judgments required. The fewer the number of judgments, the
easier it is to gain consistency. The FIST sub-criteria activities model had 153 judgments
and consistency was much more difficult to maintain. Therefore, only participants who
have a CR of 0.10 or less in the FIST sub-criteria model are included in this model.
Table 26 outlines the demographics for this model’s participants. This model contains 28
participants and is a combination of military, civilian, leaders, and non-leaders with an
average experience of 8.4 years. The model does not reflect the beliefs of a certain group
or experience level of project managers but rather participants who were consistent in
their answers. The benefit of consistency is that the results should be more valid in that
they do not contradict each other. Likewise, perhaps more time and thought was put into
answering the comparisons to obtain acceptable consistency.
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Table 26: Consistent Model Demographic Information
CONSISTENT DEMOGRAPHICS
Avg. Years of Experience

8.41

CGO
FGO

14
3

GS
Civilian
TOTAL

0
11
28

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

10
18
28

Table 27 describes the Consistent model and weights for each criterion. Simple
and Fast were heavily favored in this model. Tiny was ranked of low importance in this
model similar to the previous models described.

Table 27: Consistent FIST-AHP Model
FIST-AHP MODEL

Consistent

FAST

0.297

Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

INEXPENSIVE
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

0.127
0.229
0.280
0.159
0.206

0.206
0.225
0.281
0.138
0.246
0.111

SIMPLE

0.374

System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent

TINY

0.098
0.243
0.244
0.269
0.146

0.123

Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
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0.248
0.456
0.296

The sub-criteria model is presented in Table 28. Many of the Simple activities are
ranked high in this model. The Consistent model results are shown in Table 29. The
model’s consistency matches as the FIST values and FIST activities match in order of
importance.

Table 28: Consistent Model Results
Consistent

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)

RANK
1
2
3
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

WEIGHT
0.082
0.081
0.078
0.075
0.075
0.073
0.067
0.066
0.064
0.055
0.047
0.043
0.041
0.037
0.032
0.031
0.028
0.027

Table 29: Consistent Sub-Criteria Model
Consistent
Alternatives
Actual Outcome
NASA Mars Pathfinder
A
A-10 Thunderbolt II
A
F-20 Tigershark
F
P-51 Mustang
A
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
F
MRAP
A
E-3 Sentry AWACS
A
C-5 Galaxy
A
NASA Mars Viking Mission
A
V-22 Osprey
A
RAH-66 Comanche
F

Priority Standardized
0.169
1
0.168
0.997
0.128
0.756
0.111
0.655
0.11
0.651
0.105
0.622
0.093
0.549
0.068
0.402
0.017
0.103
0.016
0.097
0.016
0.092

FIST Value Ranking
SIMPLE
0.374
FAST
0.297
INEXPENSIVE
0.206
TINY
0.123
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FIST Combined Activity Ranking
SIMPLE
0.303
FAST
0.299
INEXPENSIVE
0.286
TINY
0.114

Expert Model Results
The Expert model was developed to incorporate all the project managers who had
15 years of experience or more in project management, advanced degrees in
management, or taken part in large programs. Most of the participants that meet these
criteria are civilians with the addition of three Lieutenant Colonels. The average
experience of this group is 17.2 years and is the most experienced of all the models. This
model is considered the most useful in analyzing FIST because these respondents have
participated in a litany of projects varying in size and complexity. Having experienced
many different projects, these 37 participants understand what activities and philosophies
are truly beneficial to a project. Table 30 shows the demographics of the expert
population.
Table 30: Expert Model Demographic Information
EXPERT DEMOGRAPHICS
Avg. Years of Experience

17.25

CGO
FGO

0
3

GS
Civilian
TOTAL

0
34
37

Leaders
Non-Leaders
TOTAL

25
12
37

Experts ranked the Fast and Simple values exceptionally high compared to
Inexpensive and Tiny. Table 31 shows the weights of the four FIST values and 18 FIST
activities. This is the only model that does not rank Tiny as the lowest value.
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Table 31: Expert FIST-AHP Model

FIST-AHP MODEL

Expert

FAST

0.326

Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

INEXPENSIVE
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

SIMPLE
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent

TINY
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation

0.141
0.295
0.198
0.178
0.188

0.182
0.257
0.174
0.165
0.270
0.133

0.309
0.112
0.156
0.245
0.269
0.218

0.183
0.326
0.344
0.330

Table 32 lists the FIST activities in order of importance according to the experts.
It is interesting to note that Heavy reliance on existing technology, Accepting project risk
to reduce cost, and maintain schedule were all low-ranked activities. These activities
were much higher ranked in other models.
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Table 32: Expert Sub-Criteria Model
Expert

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)

RANK
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
13
14
15
16

WEIGHT
0.096
0.075
0.073
0.070
0.066
0.066
0.062
0.057
0.056
0.050
0.048
0.046
0.044
0.043
0.043
0.042
0.034
0.028

The experts’ results are summarized in Tabled 33. The inconsistencies are
highlighted where Inexpensive is the lowest ranked value, but the second ranked
cumulative FIST activity. It is worth noting that there is only a small difference in the
ranking between Inexpensive and Simple in the FIST Combined Activity Ranking.
Furthermore, it is a reoccurring theme that Inexpensive FIST activities are receiving a
higher ranking than the Inexpensive FIST value. This could be due to Inexpensive not
being fully understood as a value but appreciated when decomposed into activities.

Table 33: Expert Model Results
Expert
Alternatives
Actual Outcome
NASA Mars Pathfinder
A
A-10 Thunderbolt II
A
F-20 Tigershark
F
P-51 Mustang
A
MRAP
A
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
F
E-3 Sentry AWACS
A
C-5 Galaxy
A
NASA Mars Viking Mission
A
V-22 Osprey
A
RAH-66 Comanche
F

Priority
0.17
0.169
0.129
0.113
0.111
0.096
0.088
0.072
0.019
0.017
0.016

Standardized
1
0.992
0.757
0.663
0.652
0.563
0.516
0.423
0.109
0.1
0.093
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FIST Value Ranking
FAST
0.326
SIMPLE
0.309
TINY
0.183
INEXPENSIVE
0.182

FIST Combined Activity Ranking
FAST
0.328
INEXPENSIVE
0.272
SIMPLE
0.262
TINY
0.137

Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the seven models derived from the
acquisition experiment and the ensuing alternatives ranking. The various models were
purposely developed to facilitate a comparison analysis between the different populations
of project managers. It is now possible to quantitatively analyze any differences between
civilian project managers and their military counterparts which could explain the
separation in performance. Additionally, other questions can be evaluated such as, is
leadership and non-leaders valuing the same ideas? Could the differences between the
two groups be due to leaders’ antiquated view of project management? Or, is it that nonleaders do not have the experience embodied by leadership, to run a successful project?
Lastly, based on the All Participants and Experts models, is FIST a valid model to
develop a program?

Now that the results have been presented and described, the

significance of the results can be explored in Chapter V.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The purpose of this research was to empirically theory-test FIST through the
development of an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) model to be applied as a
comparative tool. It appears certain programs are more determined to succeed under
FIST than other types of programs. Direct comparisons between similar programs will be
explored to reveal FIST short comings. These new insights will lead to recommendations
for changes to the FIST model, FIST’s validity, and future use. Last, the difference in
results between groups of program managers will reveal insights into the values of each
population.
Results Discussion
When a program receives a high FIST score, either under Ward’s (2009) FIST
model or the FIST-AHP model, this means the program was developed in accordance to
the FIST theory. This does not mean that the program will be an operational success.
Table 34 shows how each project management group ranked each program. The table is
sorted by the All Participants model, and the shaded cells represent deviations from this
model.

Table 34: Alternatives Analysis Results
Alternatives

OUTCOME WARD'S

ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS RESULTS
All Leader Non-Leader Military Civilian Consistent Expert AVERAGE

A-10 Thunderbolt II
NASA Mars Pathfinder
F-20 Tigershark
P-51 Mustang
MRAP
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle
E-3 Sentry AWACS
C-5 Galaxy

A
A
F
A
A
F
A
A

2 (35)
1 (40)
2 (35)
2 (35)
4 (15)
3 (25)
5 (5)
7 (-15)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2
1
3
4
5
6
7
8

1
2
3
4
6
5
7
8

NASA Mars Viking Mission

A

6 (-10)

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9.00

V-22 Osprey
RAH-66 Comanche

A
F

8 (-20)
8 (-20)

10
11

10
11

10
11

10
11

10
11

10
11

10
11

10.00
11.00
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1
2
3
5
6
4
7
8

2
1
3
4
5
6
7
8

2
1
3
4
6
5
7
8

2
1
3
4
5
6
7
8

1.57
1.43
3.00
4.14
5.43
5.43
7.00
8.00

Remarkably, there are not significant differences between the models. Also, the
results are similar to Ward’s (2009) ranking of the programs. This is not surprising as the
AHP model is based on the FIST rubric with the only alterations being different weights
for each activity. Therefore, the results are artificially correlated due to having the same
activities for measures.
Table 35 is the accumulation of all FIST rankings to date on Ward’s (2009)
original 22 programs. In the table, the bold program title represents Ward’s (2009)
original FIST ranking. The Co-Evaluator rankings are also taken from his thesis. The
Primary Investigator ranking represents the research completed in this thesis that
analyzes the previously stated 11 programs. The Capstone Report ranking is acquired
from the capstone project report on FIST completed by Tran and Ocampo (2012).
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Table 35: FIST Rankings of all 22 Programs
ALTERNATIVES

F

I

S

T

NASA Pathfinder Mission

10
5
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
10
10
10
10
10
5
5
0
5
10
5
10
5
10
0
0
5
0
10
5
-5
n/a
-5
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
10
10
10
5
5
10
10
10
10
5
0
10
10
10
10
-5
5
5
0
-5
-5
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
0
5
5
5
5
-5
5
0
5
0
-5
0
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
0
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
5
0
0
5
0
-5
-5
0
0
0
-5
-5
0
-5
0
-5
-5
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5

Co-Evaluator
Primary Investigator

NASA NEAR Mission
Co-Evaluator

F-16 Falcon
Co-Evaluator

A-10 Thunderbolt
Capstone Report
Primary Investigator

Pave Low III
Skunkworks
P-51 Mustang
Primary Investigator

F-5 Freedom Fighter
F-20 Tigershark
Co-Evaluator
Primary Investigator

AD Skyraider
E-3 Sentry (AWACS)
Co-Evaluator
Primary Investigator

XP-75 Eagle
Primary Investigator

C-5 Galaxy
Primary Investigator
Capstone Report

MRAP
Primary Investigator

F-15 Eagle
Co-Evaluator

Crusader Artillery
NASA Viking Mission
Primary Investigator

V-22 Osprey
Primary Investigator

Future Imagery Architecture
Division Air Defense (DIVAD)
F-22 Raptor
RH-66 Comanche
Primary Investigator

TOTAL OUTCOME
40
35
40
40
40
40
40
35
15
40
40
40
35
35
35
35
30
30
30
5
25
25
25
10
-15
15
5
15
-5
-20
0
-15
-10
-20
-20
-15
-20
-20
-20
-20
-20

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
A
A
A
A
F
F
A
A
A
A
F
A
A
F
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
F

It is immediately evident that there is a better rankings consensus among
programs that scored extremely well or extremely poor. This is not a strength of the
FIST model as these programs were such standout developmental successes or failures
that their performance is evident. What is interesting is how dissimilar many of the
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rankings are for programs that were not such obvious successes or failures. The FIST
rubric’s reliability is crucial for programs with undistinguished development. For
example, the C-5 Galaxy program received a -15 score from Ward (2009) but a 15 and 5
from subsequent investigators. Furthermore, the MRAP received a FIST score of 15
from Ward (2009) as well as an A for outcome but this research ranked the program with
a FIST score of -5 and an F for outcome. Table 35 shows that there are significant
deviations between rankings completed by different investigators. If the original FIST
rubric analysis was truly reproducible, these rankings should be significantly more
similar.
The FIST-AHP model is largely able to replicate Ward’s (2009) findings by
analyzing missions based on each of the 18 FIST activities. However, the same
replication is not realized when the programs are scored based on the four FIST values.
The difference is accounted for in the subjectivity of the four FIST values. Multiple
researchers can read the same case study and leave with differing opinions on a
program’s incorporation of the FIST values because of the vagueness of the rubric and
definition of the values. However, when researchers are only analyzing one of the 18
FIST activities at a time, the subjectively is reduced. As seen in the alternatives analysis,
when the researcher scrutinizes one discrete event in a program history, it becomes
apparent if the activity was completed, ignored, or if the information was not available.
XP-75 Eagle vs. P-51 Mustang
The XP-75 Eagle and P-51 Mustang are two WWII fighter aircraft that score well
under the FIST model but operationally, are opposites. The failed XP-75 Eagle program
receives lower scores in the AHP model than in the FIST model. The XP-75 performed
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poorly in the formal commitment to maintain deadline activity as a six month delay ended
up cancelling the program. The delay forced production to occur too late in the war.
Also, the Tiny aspect of the program was not appreciated as the XP-75 was substantially
heavier than any other successful WWII fighter aircraft (Holley, 1987:592). The factor
that led to these problems was utilizing the FIST activity, heavy reliance on existing,
mature, proven technology. “… More and more evidence emerged to indict the whole
scheme to use off-the-shelf stock components to build a superior high-performance
aircraft” (Holley, 1987:591). Consequently, the XP-75 had to be continuously modified
and redesigned to use preexisting parts from other airframes successfully. These factors
drove down the XP-75’s score under the AHP model. A sensitivity graph comparing
these two programs is shown in Figure 7. The graph shows that the Tiny aspect of the P51 program was significantly better than the XP-75.

Figure 7: P-51 vs. XP-75 Sensitivity Graph
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During the same time as the XP-75, the P-51 Mustang was an operational success
and follower of the FIST theory. The Mustang was developed quickly in 117 days and
was a cost effective capability to field (Ward, 2009). The P-51 was simple and “does not
to any extent embody previously unknown engineering features, but rather employed
refinements of known accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129). Furthermore, the
Mustang was Tiny. It could easily be maintained with existing tools and did not require
an extensive supply chain (Sanders, 1942).
So why was the XP-75 a failure and the P-51 a success if both programs score
well under the FIST model, both were developed during the same time period, and both
had similar capabilities? The key is the use of existing technology. The P-51 refined
existing technology to design a superior aircraft, whereas the XP-75 tried to brute-force,
piecemeal an advanced aircraft from parts in production from other airframes. This
teaches a valuable lesson in how to incorporate existing technology. If done
inappropriately, the consequences can ruin a program through costly redesigns and
schedule delays. “Many assume that reuse of existing components will reduce risk and
deployment time directly. Rather, a different risk is realized – the risk of using a
component in a potentially different application, with an unknown requirements and
development (and manufacturing) history” (Lepore et al., 2012:20).
This example also highlights a weakness in the FIST model. The FIST model
should advocate incremental development to accompany the use of existing technology.
When existing technology and incremental development are utilized from the beginning
of a program, known and unknown technical enhancements can be integrated into the
system easily. Incremental development is successful when employing “open
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architectures, modular concepts, clearly defining system interfaces, and utilizing industry
standards” (Lepore et al., 2012:20). The pairing of existing technology and incremental
development reduces system complexity, extends system lifecycle, and enhances the
system’s ability to adapt to emerging threats and technology. Upgrading a current system
is much more cost efficient and faster than developing a whole new platform, merely to
incorporate a single new piece of technology. By planning to use incremental
development from project initiation, upgrading is easy and efficient because the system
has been modularly designed with appropriate interfaces to accept advancements. “The
record of North American’s P-51 Mustang fighter proves, however, that it is both
possible and practical to create a single basic design that can be modified, as military
needs dictate, to keep abreast of requirements” (Nelson, 1944:127).
NASA Mars Viking vs. Pathfinder Mission
The NASA Viking and Pathfinder missions were both operational successes but
on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of following a FIST development. The Viking
mission was launched in 1975 and upon landing on Mars in 1976, was the first space
probe to obtain images of the surface of Mars. Originally designed to operate for 90 days
on the Martian surface, the Viking spacecraft collected data for six years (Viking:
Mission to Mars). The Mars Pathfinder was launched 20 years later in December 1996.
The purpose of its mission was to demonstrate the technology to deliver a lander and
rover on the Martian surface in a low cost and efficient manner.
The Viking mission is considered a developmental failure when viewed through a
FIST framework (Ward, 2009). The Viking mission was rampant with complexity,
delays, and cost overruns. The project team was massive and geographically spread out.
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Conversely, the Pathfinder mission followed the FIST ideology almost perfectly by
adhering to an aggressive schedule and budget by sacrificing performance and system
redundancy. Inexpensive was the primary driver of the Pathfinder mission, and Simple
and Tiny were the means of achieving it (Ward, 2009). A sensitivity graph in Figure 8
compares the two NASA programs which clearly shows the Pathfinder mission as the
more FISTy program.

Figure 8: Viking vs. Pathfinder Sensitivity Graph

This example is used to expose another weakness of the FIST methodology. This
weakness is that certain programs are a better fit for FIST than others. The Pathfinder
mission had 20 years of technology advancements and gained knowledge from the
Viking mission to use during its development. "The Viking team didn't know the
Martian atmosphere very well, we had almost no idea about the terrain or the rocks…”
(Viking: Mission to Mars). While it is stated that the Pathfinder team was asked to
design, build, and launch their spacecraft in three years as opposed to the six years
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afforded to the Viking mission, the Pathfinder program was replicating much of the
existing technology developed by the Viking mission (McCurdy, 2001). The timeline did
not need to be as long as the Viking mission, which produced the first two spacecraft to
land on Mars successfully (Viking: Mission to Mars). The Pathfinder team had
information available to them on the atmospheric and surface conditions of Mars as well
as shock and vibration environments experienced by the Viking lander and rover.
Therefore, the Pathfinder team had a baseline to work from and could sacrifice
redundancy and performance without the fear of crippling the entire mission.
What this comparison shows is that FIST is a poor fit for programs accomplishing
a first-time feat with minimum proven technology and information available. There are
always going to be programs that are the first to use a new technology or fill a new
capability gap. These programs cannot effectively be fully Simple or inherently Fast and
Inexpensive because the purpose of such programs is to advance the DoD capability
beyond what is currently available. If the purpose of a program was not to improve the
capability of a currently available system, then the current solution would simply be
maintained. There is always going to be a need to improve military capability in order to
remain ahead of the enemy and adapt to the ever-changing battlefield. Maturing new
technology and incorporating it into a system takes a certain amount of time that is only
hampered if developed under the FIST theory. The V-22 Osprey and F-22 Raptor would
look much different if they were developed by FIST. Instead of an advanced technology
platform, the programs would probably consist of upgrades to current systems in which
the proven worth of the upgrades could be questioned in the coming years. FIST may be
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considered a Band-Aid solution model that produces an immediate product but requires a
better solution to be fully developed in the future.
The FIST theory has advantages in certain programs, but if FIST was blindly
applied to all programs, the DoD portfolio would be full of cheap and available systems
that do not fully meet the users’ needs. FIST advocates accepting risks, reducing
capability, and using low-cost solutions in order to maintain schedule and budget
constraints. This philosophy can be advantageous for repetitive and non-critical
missions. It can be argued that if a program is too expensive and lengthy, it will never be
produced or used on the battlefield. This was witnessed with RAH-66 Comanche
helicopter program that was described in Chapter I. The reverse of this argument is also
valid. A system being developed to win the next war is rendered useless if its capability
is reduced beyond a certain point only to maintain the artificial budget and schedule.
Reflecting on the two NASA Mars missions, the weakness in FIST’s Simple value is
observed:
Inexpensive was the primary driver, and simplicity had to be enforced to bring the
program in on budget. Simplicity was implemented, but forced a reduction in
capability. These capability cutbacks were often to the disappointment of the
users (i.e. the science community), who had to sacrifice the number and types of
instruments, as well as the duration of the mission. While the Pathfinder
development team was able to take advantage of technical learning curves and
didn’t have to pay the cost of invention by their focus on simplicity, the users
weren’t getting the latest cutting edge science results. According to the FIST
principles, however, reductions in capability along with the use of mature
technology are both expected in the pursuit of simplicity. (Ward, 2009:115)

At what point does the simplification of a mission, in order to meet schedule and
budget constraints, cause the project to become obsolete or not worth the cost of
production? Simple is a double-edged sword with one side being too complex and
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expensive to pursue and the other being not technologically advanced to meet the user’s
requirements.
F-20 Tigershark vs. F-16 Fighting Falcon
The F-20 Tigershark fighter aircraft program was a privately funded venture by
the Northrop Corporation. In 1986, the program was cancelled after ten years and over
$1.2 billion spent in development (Martin and Schmidt, 1987). Northrop and FIST
consider the development of the F-20 to be a success. However, not a single F-20 was
sold to foreign or domestic markets to replace the aging F-5 Freedom Fighter. The F-20
program started out with a one page memo stating the Tigershark should have 80 percent
of the capability of the F-16 at half the cost (Martin and Schmidt, 1987). The first
Tigershark was produced 32 months after program initiation and was one month ahead of
schedule. After 1500 test flights, Northrop considered the Tigershark to be comparable
to the F-16 in performance but vastly superior in maintainability and reliability (Martin
and Schmidt, 1987).
The F-20 represents another example of a program that fits well with the FIST
framework. The F-20 did not push the technological boundary, was not the first-of-akind product, and had extensive data from previous fighter development programs to
leverage. Northrop “obviously benefitted from the technical lessons learned during the
development of the F-15 and F-16. They did not push for the cutting edge of
technology… Northrop’s willingness to derate extra performance for extra reliability and
maintainability reflected this realization” (Martin and Schmidt, 1987:9).
The F-20 Tigershark’s main competitor was the F-16. The F-20 was
characterized as an “intermediate-level fighter with less than top-line capabilities and
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technologies” (Martin and Schmidt, 1987:21). The F-20s focus was on maintainability,
reliability, and cost effectiveness of the aircraft. This adheres to the FIST mindset. With
the lenient export policies of the Reagan administration, the F-16 became available for
purchase by foreign countries. Countries such as Venezuela and Taiwan demanded the
highest level of performance in their fighter purchase and chose the F-16 over the F-20
(Martin and Schmidt, 1987). Furthermore, the F-16 was being sold at cut-rate prices with
the tab partially being picked up the U.S. Government (Eskow, 1986). While the F-20
program is a FIST developed system, the simplicity of the airframe ended up being its
undoing. Ward (2009:64) states, “The FIST values are very possibly the primary cause
of the failure.”
It can be argued that the F-20 customers did not have the same values as the
Tigershark’s developmental team. Customers ended up valuing performance over
reliability and maintainability. Also, most foreign countries did not have the need, from a
threat standpoint, or the budget to support the F-16 purchase. However, countries viewed
the F-16 as an advanced fighter that was thoroughly tested and qualified to outmatch the
F-20. If a country purchased the F-20, a neighboring enemy could threaten the whole
fleet by purchasing F-16s. “Thus, the foreign governments reasoned, it would be foolish
to spend $20 million on a plane the Americans won’t fly when you can pay less than that
for one they will fly” (Eskow, 1986:145).
The F-16 Fighting Falcon was not analyzed in this research but was included in
Ward’s (2009) thesis. The F-16 was a banner program for following FIST. The
difference is that while Simple did contribute to the aircraft’s successful development, it
did not decrease the performance below what customers deemed acceptable levels.
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Simple is a complicated value to master in the FIST theory. Too much Simple and the
project becomes the F-20 and is outclassed in performance. Not enough Simple and the
program turns into the never-ending development like the RAH-66 Comanche and is
never produced. A project manager on the NASA Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous
(NEAR) program stated, “had I incorporated even half of these good ideas, the spacecraft
would never have been built. Only those changes that could be made with negligible or
minimal disruption were even considered” (Laufer, 2000:123). Recommendations for
how to achieve Simple will be discussed in detail later.
V-22 Osprey
The V-22 Osprey program began in the wake of the failed 1980 Iran hostage
rescue. Military planners realized the need for a system to have the range and speed of a
fixed-winged aircraft but the agility and vertical landing of a conventional helicopter.
The V-22 is a tilt-rotor aircraft capable of short takeoff and landing as well as vertical
takeoff and landing. The Osprey combines the performance of a helicopter with the long
range capability of a turboprop aircraft. The V-22 took 25 years to develop, and priceper-aircraft was double that of the original estimate. The Osprey received the worst
possible FIST score in Ward’s (2009) thesis and was also ranked low in the FIST-AHP
model. The program clearly did not follow a FIST mindset for development. Ward
(2009) characterized the V-22 as an operational triumph but cautioned that the platform’s
short track record had not confirmed the Osprey as a true success. Since the time of his
thesis, the V-22 has made impressive strides operationally.
On 22 March 2011, two V-22 Ospreys launched from a Marine amphibious
assault vessel in the Mediterranean Sea, and within 90 minutes, rescued an Air Force
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pilot who crashed in Libya. “It was the first time Marines had used the V-22 in such a
mission, and the operation went very well owing to the fact that the V-22 is the only
aircraft in the world that can fly as far and fast as a turboprop airplane, and then hover or
land like a helicopter” (Thompson, 2011). In Ward’s (2009:184) thesis, the V-22
received the lowest Simple score possible, and he stated, “Simpler, mature alternatives
are available, such as the EH-101… Project leaders consistently reject these alternatives
in favor of the new, exciting ‘breakthrough’ tilt-rotor capability.” In fact, the V-22 is
changing the way the military conducts operations in a way that any conventional
helicopter cannot match. “The unrefueled combat radius of the V-22 is more than twice
that of the aging Sea Knight helicopters it is replacing, and the V-22 flies over a hundred
miles per hour faster” (Thompson, 2011). Search-and-rescue missions are conducted in
hostile territory, and the V-22 is less susceptible to damage than a conventional helicopter
due to its speed, reduced noise, and design for survivability. “Designers have built so
much protection and redundancy into the V-22 that it is probably the safest rotorcraft ever
constructed” (Thompson, 2011). It is easy to see why the Osprey received such low
scores for Simple, but contrary to Ward’s (2009) assertion that alternatives are available
like the EH-101, the V-22 is operationally unrivaled. The V-22 is truly a unique
capability that is saving lives, impressing commanders, and increasing operational
mission success. “As one Marine commander in Iraq put it, the Osprey ‘turns Texas into
Rhode Island,’ greatly increasing the reach of U.S. ground forces with an aircraft that is
both more versatile and more survivable than any conventional helicopter” (Thompson,
2011).
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The V-22 is an example of a program that is not a good fit for the FIST model. It
is a new, costly technology that was required to be developed to fill a capability gap.
Merely upgrading current helicopters would not fulfill the capability gap the V-22 is
currently accomplishing. If future tilt-rotor aircraft models are produced, the program
should consider the FIST approach to development because the technology has been
matured by the V-22 platform. When a critical need is realized, utilizing the FIST
mentality will create a temporary fix, only postponing the complete solution that needs to
eventually be developed.
Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle
The MRAP program is clearly a program that should have grasped the FIST
concept during development. There is an urgent need to provide troops with vehicles that
can provide protection from roadside bombs. Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the
biggest single killer of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq (Sisk, 2012). The flatbottomed Humvee was not adequately protecting troops from this threat.
There are four reasons the MRAP is the perfect program, from the onset, to be
developed under FIST. First, the system needs to reach the war-fighter as quickly as
possible. Every day the troops are without this capability, casualties are occurring. The
FIST value of Fast can help accomplish rapid development. Second, a vast number of
MRAPs are needed on the battlefield to ensure every unit has access to the system.
Creating an inexpensive system will ensure enough MRAPs can be produced to meet
demand. The Inexpensive value in the FIST theory will provide guidance to achieve a
cost-effective solution. Third, the blast-defecting, V-shaped hulls are not advanced
technology that requires time and money to develop. The technology is not complicated
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as the MRAP is fundamentally a Humvee with protection from IEDs. FIST’s Simple
value can ensure the program maintains performance while not slowing down
development to incorporate every brilliant idea engineers cultivate. Fourth, the MRAP
must consider the Tiny value of FIST. The MRAP should have weight constraints that
allow it to be transported by helicopter, ship, and aircraft. If the weight is not controlled,
there will be little difference between the MRAP and the medium-armored class of
vehicles. Also, the supply chain, such as replacement parts and tools required to service
the vehicle should be minimized to improve the maintainability and reliability of the
vehicle. Tiny has the potential to ensure these characteristics are considered and planned
for during development.
The MRAP scored 15 out of 40 possible points in Ward’s (2009) thesis and
averaged fifth place out of 11 in the AHP model. The program certainty exhibited some
aspects of FIST, especially Fast, but not to the extent possible. While considered an
operational success by Ward (2009), the MRAP in 2012 is already seeing a decreased
role. The last MRAP was moved out of Iraq in April of 2012. In Afghanistan, only
limited numbers are still in use (Ewing, 2012). As of September 2012, the Marine Corps’
plan is to retain about 2,500 of the 27,740 vehicles that were produced. The price of the
MRAP is between $535,000 and $600,000 depending on the model, but with spare parts
and upgrades, the vehicle costs an average of $1.29 million each (Sisk, 2012). “The
heavily-protected vehicles were no more effective at reducing casualties than the medium
armored vehicles” and the MRAPs are “three times as expensive as medium protected
vehicles” (Rohlfs and Sullivan, 2012). Now, having spent nearly $50 billion on the
MRAP fleet, the military finds little use for it. Consequently, many newly produced
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MRAPs will never see the theater and instead will be placed straight into storage (Rogers,
2012).
It can be argued that the MRAP was a limited success but ended up being too
heavy and expensive. The MRAP is seeing an early retirement after only five years of
service. This analysis considers the MRAP a failure due to its limit role and short
operational life. This example is used to show that if FIST was properly utilized on the
MRAP program, the cost and weight might have been reduced to acceptable levels.
Additionally, the MRAP program highlights many of the characteristics that make a
program acceptable to be developed by FIST.
Programs Fit for FIST
The MRAP concept is an example of a program that fits perfectly within the FIST
framework for development. Four characteristics have emerged from the analysis that
point towards a program using FIST for development:





Urgent Need Capabilities
Budget Constrained Programs
Repeated Programs
Not Advancing Technology

Urgent Need Capabilities
FIST works particularly well with programs that have an urgent need to reach the
battlefield. In this case, the project development team must rely on mature technology
and maintaining deadlines over developing the complete solution. “Rapid programs
rarely provide the customer with 100% of what they ask for. Interviewees expressed the
typical ‘80% solution’ concept, but also a more realistic… ‘23% solution’ in practice”
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(Lepore et al., 2012:23). It is more important for the system to reach the battlefield and
be used to win the current war, or save lives, than to delay development in pursuit of the
never-ending 100% solution. Incremental development and clear customer requirements
can be applied to get a product quickly into production with the ability to upgrade future
versions with maturing technology that would otherwise drag development pace to a
crawl. Fielding the system quickly and then developing modular block upgrades will
save money and time as well as increase the lifespan of the system. Furthermore,
customers often ask for more capability than they actually need and there is simply not
enough time to give the customer everything. Customers have unrealistic expectations of
the current state of technology, difficulty of requests, and the price of certain capabilities.
Collaborating in face-to-face meetings with the customer and developing a stable set of
realistic requirements is crucial to delivering an operationally successful system.
Requirements should be certified with the customer early and often to establish needs
based on capabilities. Requirements creep negatively impacts a program’s schedule,
budget, and design, and also weakens the scope. If the project team is uncertain of the
main purpose of the system due to requirements creep, the operational success is in
jeopardy. “The acquiring organization must be willing to push back against unfeasible
requirements, or schedule impacting requirements, in the interest of time” (Lepore et al.,
2012:22). Incremental development and requirements definition are two areas the FIST
theory currently does not incorporate. With research such as that published by Lepore et
al., showing the importance of these activities in rapid acquisition, these tools should be
added to the FIST model to ensure urgent needed weapon systems reach the war-fighter
in a timely manner.
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Budget Constrained Programs
Programs that have small, constrained budgets are good candidates for FIST
development. Project teams that realize they will not receive additional funding, or that
future funding could be in danger, would benefit from the FIST framework. Inexpensive
programs do not have the budget for a long, drawn-out schedule or for maturing
technology that is currently undeveloped. FIST optimizes programs with small budgets
by using the Simple and Tiny values as tools to maintain schedule and budget. FIST
emphasizes implementing existing technology, accepting risks, creating a small
development team, seeking low-cost solutions, and formally committing to the budget
and schedule.
The A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft is a concrete example of a budget constrained,
successful FIST program. In the early 1960s, the Air Force emphasized strategic
bombing and air superiority over close air support (CAS). While CAS was officially an
Air Force role, the Air Force did not have a dedicated aircraft specifically designed for
ground attack and CAS. As a result, the Army started arming helicopters to supplement
CAS. In 1966, The Research and Development Corporation (RAND) conducted a CAS
study and stated, “The Air Force should take immediate and positive steps to obtain a
specialized close air support aircraft, simpler and cheaper than the A-7, and with equal or
better characteristics than the A-1” (Goldberg and Smith, 1971:33). This statement
shows, from project initiation, that the A-10 should be simple and inexpensive and also
utilize technology that is already fielded. These characteristics are the strengths of the
FIST model.
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During the A-10 program development timeline, the Air Force was advancing the
expensive stealth technology and there was little room in the budget for the A-10 to be
costly. Therefore, the emphasis was on fulfilling the capability gap of CAS with the most
cost-effective solution possible. What resulted was a proposal for 600 aircraft with a
design-to-cost goal of $1.4 million unit flyaway cost (FY70$) (Jacques, D. and Strouble,
2008). The program produced an aircraft that met cost goals and fulfilled the CAS role.
In fact, the A-10 is still in use today and has proven its worth in combat over many
airframes that cost exponentially more to produce.
As further evidence of the importance of incremental analysis in rapid
acquisitions, the A-10 developed several different packages of technology in order to
meet the initial operational capability (IOC) of December 1970. “The avionics for the AX were specified in terms of a ‘skeleton’ package (below minimum requirements), a
‘lean’ package (met only minimum requirements), and three add-on packages that would
supplement the ‘lean’ package” (Jacques and Strouble, 2008:20). Each add-on package
increased the strike capability of the A-10 but was presented as options to the Air Force,
each with different costs. This allowed the Air Force to choose the A-10 package that
matched the budget with the potential to upgrade in the future should the threat
environment change. Incremental development is a technique that fields the system
quickly and inexpensively while leaving room for future add-ons to increase the
capability to the desired level. The added benefit of quick delivery and incremental
improvement is receiving early feedback from the war-fighter on the system. Perceived
upgrades and planned future capabilities may not be required or may go a different
direction than initially realized. It is impossible to understand fully how the system will
93

be deployed in the field and which upgrades will be required as opposed to which
upgrades are a waste of development time and funding. Allow the war-fighter to use the
basic system as quickly as possible and incorporate their feedback into block upgrades
instead of pursuing enhancements that engineers stateside deem as important.
Repeated Programs
The previously compared NASA Mars Viking and Pathfinder missions lead into
the next characteristic of a program fit for FIST. Programs that are repeated or have vast
historical data are acceptable programs to be developed under FIST. The Mars Viking
mission was not FISTy in its development because it was accomplishing a first-of-a-kind
mission with little information on the Martian environment. The Mars Pathfinder
mission, launched 20 years later, was FISTy and leveraged the lessons learned and data
derived from the Viking mission to speed up development and reduce costs. The
Pathfinder team was able to scale-back technology and redundancy in order to maintain
schedule and budget.
Repeat programs, often frequent with space launch missions, can utilize FIST by
striving to reuse proven technology and leveraging data from previous efforts. The focus
should be on integrating the legacy system with new, developed technology as necessary
based on mission requirements. Existing technology can be innovatively integrated into a
platform to create a short term, rapid solution. In rapid acquisitions, there is not
sufficient time to mature unproven technology. Immature technology is a pitfall that
requires time and money to foster. “In Technology Readiness Level (TRL) terms, this
means nothing less than a TRL 6, preferably 7 or 8” to incorporate technology into a
rapid development program (Lepore et al., 2012:19). The MRAP vehicle could have
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taken a FIST approach to development by taking advantage of existing vehicle designs
and adding the blast-deflecting hulls. Utilizing proven technology and designs,
minimizes rework which generally does not add value to a program. “Rework is perhaps
the most common form of time-sink that system development projects experience”
(Lepore et al., 2012:36). Instead of testing, verification, and validation of an entire
design, attention can be centered on the upgrades such as the mine-resistant hull of the
MRAP. Any program that is merely an evolution of previous systems should employ
FIST in order to maintain focus on developing the end product quickly while avoiding the
pitfalls of beyond-state-of-the-art technology and requirements creep.
Not Advancing Technology
FIST, with the addition of incremental development, could be used when a system
can meet user requirements without the use of immature technology. If the technology
needed is already in use in other platforms, or is at a sufficient readiness level, the
program can be developed rapidly. There are many benefits to rapid development
including greater stability in project requirements, funding, and personnel. The project is
completed so fast that there is a reduced chance of leadership and political change
affecting the program. More importantly, the war-fighter receives the capability before
the threat environment can change and render the platform obsolete.
FIST can ensure the program makes the correct trade-offs between performance,
cost, and time. Incremental development can ensure the program plans for advancements
to be seamlessly incorporated into the design in the future. This will keep the system
relevant and allow emerging technology to be matured in the labs instead of in the
program office where it would hold up production.
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The A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft serves as yet another example of the use of
existing technology innovatively assembled to create a superior capability. Engineers
chose a simple design and did not hold up production for the latest advancements because
the technology was readily available to build a CAS aircraft that met Air Force criteria.
“The nose of the plane is pointed at the target and a burst of cannon shells squeezed off—
simply, quickly and efficiently” (Burton, 1993:25).
Programs Unfit for FIST
Certain programs in the analysis were operational successes with imperative
capabilities. Nevertheless, they were developmental failures and did not resemble the
FIST methodology. While these capabilities still needed to be developed, program
characteristics emerged that showed certain types of programs do not fit the FIST
development model:





Large Systems
Inherently Expensive
First-of-a-Kind Programs
Advancing Technology

Large Systems
One of the most misunderstood FIST values during the experiment was Tiny.
Project managers understood the concept of reducing the team size, process, and
documentation but thought it had little to do with overall program success when
compared to the other values. When managing programs, such as massive highway
systems or the C-5 Galaxy aircraft, the best solution was not to reduce the size of the
project because size is what made the project a success. If the C-5 Galaxy was reduced in
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size, it would not meet operational objectives. Large projects, such as cargo aircraft,
naval ships, civilian bridges and buildings, need to be large by design. Massive projects
often have long schedules due to the amount of work that needs to be accomplished.
Longer schedules produce larger budgets. Often complications arise on large programs
because there are more areas for problems to surface and there may be remarkably little
historical data to leverage.
When the C-5 was developed in 1970, it was the largest aircraft in the world
(Griffin, 2005). Making an aircraft larger than anything else built before is bound to have
unknown issues and a lack of existing technology. This makes the Simple value hard to
enforce. “But building a big airplane like the C-5A was not just a matter of scaling up the
smaller C-141. When the increase in size passed a certain point, technical challenges and
changes cropped up” (Gregory, 1989:110). Large programs require a larger project team
compared to smaller endeavors. More workers, machinery, and larger facilities are
required to complete the work.
All four FIST values seem to have issues with a program that is characteristically
large. Of course, large programs can find value in following FIST, such as using existing
technology where possible, maintaining the deadline and budget, and choosing low-cost,
simple solutions. Yet, many of these concepts are basic project management skills, not
unique ideas belonging to FIST. Project managers are always attempting to complete
programs on schedule, budget, and performance while making tradeoffs for capability,
risk, and cost. Large programs just do not fit the FIST model because FIST emphasizes a
fast pace, lowest-cost, simple solution, and small-as-possible system. Large programs
often have to invent their own technology to handle the load or expanse of the project
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because there may be no other project like it in the world. Immature technology has
proven to be slow, expensive, and complicated to develop. This illustrates that large
programs may not be able to employ FIST successfully.
Inherently Expensive Programs
Programs that are inescapably expensive are going to be a poor fit for the FIST
model. Expensive projects can occur when a program is developing an emerging
technology, completing a first-of-a-kind task, or conducting a project that is so vast, it has
a great deal of oversight and unforeseen issues. Expensive programs are projects that are
so imperative to national defense or saving human life that corners cannot be cut and
risks cannot be accepted.
In some fields, such as space launch programs, the customer may state there is no
limit to the amount of additional funding they would pay to increase mission reliability
from 99.5 to 99.9 percent. That is how important success is to certain missions. Space
and material programs are decidedly different. Often satellites are irreplaceable if lost
due to a launch anomaly. The reason is that satellites are often so complex, one-of-akind, and expensive that funding will never exist to replicate the undertaking. Often the
space community will never observe the outcome of the technology developed in a lost
satellite mission because the program will never be repeated.
When a program’s success is vital to win the next war, defend national security,
or maintain the U.S. technological advantage, the program is going to be inherently
expensive. These types of programs are needed to be accomplished to maintain
battlefield superiority regardless of cost or schedule. As a closing example, the V-22
Osprey may have taken 25 years and billions in cost overruns to produce, but there is not
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a system capable of replicating its versatility. Now that the V-22 is operational, it is
saving lives, raising morale, and changing military doctrine unlike any conventional
helicopter.
First-of-a-Kind Programs
First-of-a-kind, revolutionary programs are undertakings that have little to no
legacy systems and historic information to exploit. In this analysis, the V-22 Osprey’s
tilt-rotor, the C-5 Galaxy’s size, and the NASA Viking mission’s first landing on Mars all
represent projects that blazed a new path technologically. These three missions were all
operational successes and all considered FIST failures. These missions dealt with
unknown challenges and technology. Existing, proven technology was either limited or
non-existent. Therefore, producing unique solutions was costly, time consuming, and
decisively not FISTy. The pattern from the analysis indicates that programs that are firstof-a-kind are all FIST failures. Some of these FIST failures are operational successes,
and some are disasters, such as the RAH-66 Comanche.
While these aforementioned programs were not FISTy, they were not developed
under the rapid development mindset. The solution to first-time projects may be a term
known as technical debt. Technical debt was developed by Cunningham (2013) in the
early 1990s in relation to software design and was later applied to rapid acquisitions in a
technical report published by the Systems Engineering Research Center. Technical debt
“is a way to describe the risks and compromises made in rapid acquisitions” (Lepore et
al., 2012:26). Technical debt includes the processes or technology that is chosen not to
be completed immediately, but to be delayed until it is more developed or understood.
The development progresses by designing the areas or subsystems that are understood, all
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the while leaving room in the design to include the postponed technology. When the
deferred technology has reached an adequate level of maturity, it can be designed into the
system or incorporated via a modular upgrade to existing units. As more and more items
are postponed for development, technical debt is incurred. Interest is paid on this debt by
having to revisit and incorporate the postponed technology into the system while hoping
the design has left adequate room without too much costly redesign. Programs should
not get into too much technical debt by attempting to incorporate vast amounts of
immature technology on the gamble that it will be ready for integration during program
development. Cunningham explains technical debt in the following interview excerpt:
Let’s take part of what we understand and express that. And then react to that and
express more. And react to that and express more. It’s an incremental approach. I
think it’s important if you’re going to take an incremental approach, you might
learn something tomorrow that influences design decisions you’ve made today.
That should be considered a good thing – to be able to take tomorrow’s learning
and not discard it because you’ve made a decision today. That requires a set of
practices that were unfamiliar early on… where you had to make a bunch of
decisions up front early. (Cunningham, 2013)

When too much technical debt is accumulated, the engineers try to utilize too
much advanced technology and are never able to finish the program. However, when
technical debt is executed properly, the project team is able to delay final decisions about
emerging technology until later in the program when the advancements are better
understood. Minimizing and choosing only key sub-systems to postpone will add to the
success of utilizing the tool of technical debt.
Advancing Technology
When the purpose of a program is to adapt cutting-edge technology into a system,
so as to deliver an innovative capability, FIST is not an appropriate model to follow.
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Also, FIST is not advantageous for research labs that are maturing a technology to be
used in future programs. The reason being, FIST is designed to meet a war-fighter need
quickly, with available technology, so that the new system can be deployed against the
enemy of the current engagement, not the next war. Advanced technology is always
going to need to be developed in order to stay ahead of enemy capabilities. Failures in
advanced technology programs still provide a leap forward in technology that can be
harnessed in other programs inexpensively. Optimizing the failure can occur anywhere
from learning from mistakes to capitalizing on newly developed technology. The
solution to developing advanced technology may lie in an ambidextrous organizational
structure.
Lepore et al. (2012) explores the concept of an ambidextrous organization.
Ambidextrous organizations consist of an exploration and exploitation structure. The
exploration structure is tasked with inventing and developing new technology and is
commonly associated with the early concept development phase. “Personnel working in
exploration structures tend to be rewarded for taking risks, generating new information or
technologies, and creating new opportunities for the program” (Lepore et al., 2012:42).
The exploitation structure is focused on implementing the technology developed by the
exploration team. “Exploitation generally has substantial routines in place, including
milestones, project management practices, and specific work activities identified that
should be performed in particular order” (Lepore et al., 2012:42).
Technology development should take place in an exploration structure in which
the team’s priority is to create technology that is suitable to be used in a weapon system.
The exploitation structure should develop actual weapon systems, utilizing only
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technology that has been advanced far enough by the exploration team to be used in a
program. With exploration and exploitation organizations working in concert, the
exploitation team can use incremental development and technology debt to incorporate
new technology from the exploration team. The exploration team should keep the
exploitation unit abreast of the current advances in technology with realistic timeframes
so projects are not artificially delayed for technology that is years from maturity.
FIST Activities
One of the many outcomes stemming from the experiment was a ranking of the
FIST activities from most important to project development success to least. Table 36
shows how each of the seven groups of project managers ranked the FIST activities. The
table is sorted by the All Participants model. The Rank column lists the ranking of each
activity corresponding to each group. The Weight column represents the priority vector
or weight of that activity. The combined weight for each project manager group adds up
to 1.0.
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Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL

All

Leader

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
0.083
0.081
0.081
0.079
0.077
0.076
0.068
0.065
0.064
0.051
0.043
0.041
0.039
0.037
0.031
0.031
0.027
0.025

3
5
1
3
12
6
2
3
4
11
7
10
9
8
13
14
16
15
0.069
0.062
0.090
0.069
0.044
0.061
0.077
0.069
0.068
0.045
0.052
0.049
0.049
0.051
0.040
0.040
0.029
0.036

2
6
7
1
4
5
8
6
3
10
9
8
13
11
12
14
15
14
0.082
0.065
0.064
0.084
0.074
0.072
0.057
0.065
0.080
0.047
0.052
0.057
0.034
0.042
0.037
0.031
0.026
0.031

WEIGHT

Non-Leader

RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT RANK

Military

Civilian

Consistent

Expert

AVERAGE

4
2
8
1
6
5
7
5
3
11
10
13
11
9
14
12
15
16

0.074
0.082
0.062
0.083
0.068
0.073
0.062
0.073
0.075
0.042
0.051
0.037
0.042
0.053
0.031
0.038
0.027
0.026

3
10
1
6
14
8
2
7
4
11
9
5
14
13
12
16
17
15

0.074
0.050
0.097
0.067
0.042
0.058
0.075
0.063
0.070
0.048
0.052
0.069
0.042
0.043
0.047
0.034
0.028
0.041

1
2
5
3
4
4
6
8
7
9
10
11
13
12
14
15
16
17

0.082
0.081
0.073
0.078
0.075
0.075
0.067
0.064
0.066
0.055
0.047
0.043
0.037
0.041
0.032
0.031
0.028
0.027

3
9
1
5
14
7
2
5
4
11
8
6
12
13
10
15
16
13

0.073
0.050
0.096
0.066
0.042
0.057
0.075
0.066
0.070
0.046
0.056
0.062
0.044
0.043
0.048
0.034
0.028
0.043

2
5
4
3
8
6
5
6
5
10
9
9
12
11
13
15
16
15

0.077
0.067
0.080
0.075
0.060
0.067
0.069
0.066
0.070
0.048
0.050
0.051
0.041
0.044
0.038
0.034
0.028
0.033

RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT

Military vs. Civilian
The Military model will be compared to the Civilian model to discern any
differences in project management values between the two communities. The civilians
selected for the experiment primarily have experience in infrastructure and transportation
projects. While this differs from military weapon system development, the scope of the
civilian projects is large enough to validate the comparison. The strength behind the
civilian responses is that this group has many years of experience in the field, plus they
manage for profit in a competitive industry. If civilian project managers allow cost
increases to absorb their profit margins, their job and company are in danger. The
civilian project management world is competitive with multiple firms bidding for
projects. This competition sharpens civilian project managers’ skill set and forces the
deficient managers out. Table 37 illustrates how the military and civilian project
managers ranked the 18 FIST activities.

Table 37: Military vs. Civilian Activity Ranking

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
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Military

Civilian

RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT
1
0.067
0.083
6
2
0.082
10
0.050
3
0.075
4
0.070
4
0.074
3
0.074
5
0.073
8
0.058
5
0.073
7
0.063
6
0.068
14
0.042
7
0.062
1
0.097
7
0.062
2
0.075
8
0.053
13
0.043
9
0.051
9
0.052
10
0.042
11
0.048
10
0.042
14
0.042
11
0.038
16
0.034
12
0.037
5
0.069
13
0.031
12
0.047
14
0.027
17
0.028
15
0.026
15
0.041

The first difference that is immediately apparent is how significantly civilians
emphasize Formal commitment to maintain deadlines and budget. Civilians ranked
maintaining deadlines as their most prominent activity and maintaining budget as their
second most important activity. Both these activities tied for seventh place in the military
model. This can indicate that civilian project managers are more aware of the schedule
and budget than their military counterparts. The military uses schedule delays and cost
overruns as project management tools to solve problems. The civilian industry is more
focused on accomplishing the task in the timeframe given and with the allowable budget.
One of the civilian responses to the experiment provided the following feedback:
Project has scope/schedule/budget and quality - all are inter-related. Based on my
experience on managing engineers in design, the only way to control the budget
(cost of the work) is to manage the schedule. If you give an engineer three
months to do a design, he will work on it for three months. You can demand the
same design be done in two months, and you will get the same level of design, but
at 2/3rds the cost and in 2/3rds the time.

This feedback may be the driving force behind why civilians and experts ranked
Fast as by far the most important FIST value. The military ranked Simple as the most
important FIST value. This value difference could be due to the fact that the military
does not deal with profits to the extent that transpires the private industry. The military is
focused on providing the best capability to the battlefield, whereas civilian project
managers are determined to complete the project based on the client’s goals. “As
consultants, we work for our clients and various clients have various goals - managing a
project for a client measures success by attaining the client’s goals.” This feedback,
provided by another civilian project manager, demonstrates how their priorities change
based on the client’s needs. In the military, if a capability is required promptly, project
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managers’ mindset should change to reflect accomplishing the project as fast as possible.
However, if the goal of the project is to develop advanced technology, the priority should
be to increase capability over project pace.
Next, the military stressed three tasks that their civilian contemporaries did not
value as highly:




Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of low-cost
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology

The first reason that may explain this difference could be that the civilians surveyed do
not develop technology to the extent of the military. However, if civilians are concerned
with profits, why do they not value low-cost solutions? The answer is that the low-cost
FIST activity may be too vague. One civilian respondent commented:
Importance of low-cost can have a few very different interpretations. What is the
project’s objective: lowest design cost, lowest construction cost, or lowest
lifecycle cost? Often getting the lowest lifecycle cost on a highway facility means
higher capital construction costs - think Portland Cement Concrete (PCC)
pavement versus asphalt pavement. PCC will cost more to install, but last and
perform better over a longer term.

Choosing the lowest cost solution may not always be the best course of action as
life cycle costs could overwhelm any savings realized during development. “Experience
indicates that a large percentage of the total cost for many systems is the direct result of
the downstream activities associated with the operation and support of these systems,
whereas the commitment of these costs is based on the engineering and management
decision made in the early conceptual and preliminary design stages of the life cycle”
(Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2005:582). Therefore, low-cost solutions during development
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may not be optimal if other costs are not taken into consideration such as testing,
production, training, operations, maintenance, retirement, and disposal.
For the FIST activity of Heavy reliance on existing technology, one civilian
project manager responded “… using tried and true existing systems is good, but it stifles
innovation.” Civilian project managers commented that they are always looking for
innovative ways of completing a project better, faster, or for a lower overall cost. Lastly,
civilian project managers de-emphasized concrete steps to reduce development time.
This could be contributed to civilian project managers simply not having a lot of
experience in development since the nature of their projects mainly encompasses
infrastructure and transportation that already has established mature technology.
It is worth noting that civilian project managers ranked the activities of accepting
risk lower than the military ranked these activities. Risks are often viewed as negative
and should be avoided or mitigated. In rapid acquisitions, risk taking may be the only
course of action available to deliver technology to the battlefield. Additionally, civilians
greatly highlighted the importance of relying on employee talent. This leads directly into
one of the key observations from Lepore et al. (2012). Based on interview analysis
conducted in that research, project manager autonomy is vital. Placing decision-making
at the lowest level “shortens the process, reduces opportunity for stall time, and fosters
close relationships” (Lepore et al., 2012:27). In order to have confidence and trust in the
low-level project managers, leadership must rely on the talent in their organization. The
private industry understands this concept and eliminates some of the time-consuming
bureaucracy and oversight that plagues the military. Civilians trust the project managers
running the program to make the correct decisions.
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Leaders vs. Non-Leaders
This comparison is between both civilian and military project managers who have
assumed a leadership position and those project managers who have no leadership
experience. The purpose of this comparison is to see if there are any disconnects between
leaders and those carrying out the vision of the leaders. Table 38 provides a direct
comparison of the FIST activity rankings between the two groups.

Table 38: Leader vs. Non-Leader Activity Ranking

SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)

Leader

Non-Leader

RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT
1
0.064
0.090
7
2
0.077
8
0.057
3
0.069
2
0.082
3
0.069
1
0.084
3
0.069
6
0.065
4
0.068
3
0.080
5
0.062
6
0.065
6
0.061
5
0.072
7
0.052
9
0.052
8
0.051
11
0.042
9
0.049
8
0.057
10
0.049
13
0.034
11
0.045
10
0.047
12
0.044
4
0.074
13
0.040
12
0.037
14
0.040
14
0.031
15
0.036
14
0.031
16
0.029
15
0.026

Leaders prefer to have a Formal commitment to maintain deadlines and budget
while non-leaders favor Concrete steps taken to actually reduced development time and
the Importance of simplicity. This observation is characteristic of many organizations in
which leaders are not heavily involved in the daily activities and judge progress and
performance based on how well the schedule and budget are being followed. Workers,
on the other hand, prefer simplicity in design, documentation, and organization so that
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they clearly understand the framework for managing the project. A complicated
reporting structure with massive amounts of unnecessary documentation buries project
managers under a mountain of tasks and hinders their ability to manage a project.
Non-leaders also have a strong preference for utilizing proven and existing
technology whereas leaders show exceedingly little emphasis in this area. This
disconnect could create problems through leadership expecting more cutting-edge,
innovative technology to be included in projects. Non-leaders see the difficulty in
managing and maturing new technology and prefer proven technology that has known
capabilities and reduced risks. Emerging technology will have many unknown flaws
where proven technology has significantly less unknown problems that negatively affect
development.
Leaders ranked contractual incentives and accepting risks as a higher valued
activity than non-leaders. This could be due to the fact that these are activities that upper
management approves and has input in during the project. Non-leaders focused in more
on Relying on employees’ talent and taking Concrete steps to reduce development time
and cost. If a project manager can streamline development, the other activities such as
risks, incentives, and maintaining a schedule will all be positively affected.
The conclusion from this comparison shows that leadership is more interested in a
project that maintains the given schedule and budget while developing innovative
solutions that use unproven technology. Leaders are willing to accept risks and provide
contractual incentives to bring a project in on time and budget. Non-leaders are focused
on concrete steps to improve development in both time and cost. If development can be
improved, the deadlines and budget will be met, and there is less need to accept risks and
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provide incentives to complete the project. Furthermore, non-leaders would rather rely
on their talent and a simplified process for managing a project. Leaders view the triedand-true project management process and required documentation as a safety net so that
if the project fails, the blame cannot be placed on them for trying a new method of project
management. Adding further evidence to this trend, leaders ranked the FIST value Fast
as most important and non-leaders ranked Simple as the most crucial value.
Experts
The experts’ top five activities for project management are:
1. Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
2. Formal commitment to maintain budget
3. Importance of Simplicity
4. Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
5 (Tied). Importance of Speed
5 (Tied). Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time

These activities are extremely important to successful project management based
on experts’ opinion in project management. Three of these activities fall under the Fast
category, two under Inexpensive, and one under Simple. While these activities are not
unique to FIST, the activities should remain as cornerstones to the FIST model.

The least valued activities by experts are the following:
12. Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
13 (Tied). Importance of Small
13 (Tied). Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
14. Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology
15. Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
16. System capability less than previous systems

As shown by these activities, experts do not place significance on accepting risks
to further a project, using contractual incentives, or using proven technology. Experts
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agree that the Importance of small is minimal as some projects are inherently large by
nature. Across all groups, System capability less than previous systems, was not valued
or understood. These activities are candidates for improvement or elimination for the
FIST model.
One interesting note is that both civilians and experts did not value low-cost
solutions, and instead emphasized employee talent much more than other groups of
project managers. As stated earlier, low-cost solutions during development could have
unforeseen life-cycle cost consequences. Also, relying on employee talent can speed up a
project by placing decision-making authority with the front-line project managers.
Experts, like the civilian model, ranked Fast as the most important FIST value. Based on
feedback from the experiment, civilians and experts alike believed controlling the
schedule would, in turn, control the budget and the program in general. If the schedule
allowed time for the development of innovative solutions, the project manager should setaside time to explore the new technology.
Poor FIST Activities
System capability less than previous systems, was commonly the lowest ranked
activity and the least understood throughout all the models. One civilian project manager
commented, “I also had trouble with the activities that dumbed down and reduced the
capability of the current widget. I find it hard to believe that you would want to develop
a new version of something that would have less capability.” This activity was difficult
to understand while completing the alternatives analysis. It was not clear exactly what
this activity meant.
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Importance of small was the next activity that was ranked low in all models. This
activity was part of the Tiny FIST value. Tiny was ranked last of the four values in all
models except in the experts’ model where it is essentially tied for last with Inexpensive.
Overall, the three Tiny activities ranked in the bottom half of the analysis in all project
manager groups. Whether this value and activities are misunderstood or not valued, this
is clearly a weakness in the FIST model. Obviously, changes will need to be made to the
Tiny value in order to create a stronger, better-rounded model.
Feedback from one expert stated that some activities would negate having to
complete the other activities. Therefore, if a project manager took the FIST framework
and tried to enforce all the activities in an attempt to be FISTy, they would be duplicating
some efforts and confusing the project team by administering multiple methods of
achieving the same ends. For example, using proven technology and accepting risks are
opposites. Project managers use proven technology so they have less risk to accept.
The last piece of constructive feedback comes from an expert with 36 years of
experience who stated, “I believe that perhaps this is a bit too academic and generic and
maybe I have had too much PM [project management] experience.” The FIST values,
activities, and framework are hard to criticize because they represent good project
management ideals. However, there seems to be little depth to the model that can be used
to actually run a program.
Recommendations
FIST should be viewed as a rapid development acquisition model. It is not a
perfect fit for all programs. NASA experimented in 1990s with Faster, Better, Cheaper
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and FIST seems to be a projection of this mentality into the DoD acquisitions. The
analysis of historic weapon system development has revealed many strengths and
weaknesses of the FIST model. The ranking of FIST values and activities by a wide
spectrum of project managers has exposed flaws in the FIST ideology. This section will
provide recommended changes to the FIST model.
Inexpensive
The first two FIST values of Fast and Inexpensive basically translate to the
concepts of time and cost on the Iron Triangle of project management. This leaves
Simple and Tiny to account for the quality aspect of the Iron Triangle. The only
recommended change to Inexpensive is under the activity of Importance of low-cost.
This should have a caveat that project managers should consider the lifecycle costs to
ensure a tradeoff during development does not create excessive costs in downstream
phases of the system. Other than this recommendation, Fast and Inexpensive are straight
forward project management concepts that are not new to the profession.
Simple
The Simple activity of System capability less than the previous system should be
eliminated or further expanded so that it can be understood. Instead of this activity, it is
recommended to add generational development as a Simple activity. Generational
development is described in a technical report on rapid capability by Lepore et al. (2012).
This concept is similar to incremental development except it is determined to be used
from the beginning of development as a way for known and unknown technology
advancements to be seamlessly incorporated into the system. This technique fits
perfectly with the FIST mindset because it allows a weapon system to use existing
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technology in order to rapidly release the product to the war-fighter. The added benefit is
the ability to upgrade the system in the future with technology that can mature outside of
the weapon system program where it will not delay progress. As Cunningham (2013)
stated “you might learn something tomorrow that influences design decisions you’ve
made today. That should be considered a good thing – to be able to take tomorrow’s
learning and not discard it because you’ve made a decision today.” In the future,
generational development will allow platforms to be upgraded instead of the development
of a new weapon system. Engineers and project managers need to be aware of the
technology improvements on the horizon and should target those areas in the system for
easy incremental upgrades.
Awareness of technological breakthroughs leads into the next recommendation.
To expand the Simple activity of Importance of simplicity, development organizations
should have an ambidextrous organization. As previously explained, the organization
consists of an exploration structure that seeks and matures new technology and an
exploitation structure that takes the established technology to be assimilated into a
system. Each structure communicates frequently with each other to share knowledge on
advancements and requirements to create a symbiotic relationship. This consistent
communication enables the exploration structure to maintain focus on developing
technology that is needed to fill a capability gap. At the same time, it allows the
exploitation structure to understand what technology is available for integration and
which is too immature to be used in the current system.
The next recommendation surrounds the activities of the Reliance on employees’
talent and the Tiny activity, Importance of small. This explanation should be expanded to
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include a definition of a successful small project team. It is not adequate to merely state:
have a small project team. The project team must consist of people with the right
background, education, and experience for the project. Allowing important programs to
handpick their personnel will ensure the required skill sets for a project are covered by
experts on the team. The low-level project managers should be empowered with
decision-making authority and the freedom to keep the program pace moving rapidly. In
a rapid development or FIST program, the employees should be comfortable with taking
risks and working in an unstructured and ambiguous environment. Minimize the
reporting structure and keep it informal to reduce time-consuming oversight reviews.
Decisions to proceed should not be halted until the weekly leadership meeting but rather
should occur spontaneously and informally as decisions arise. One way to reduce
organizational complexity is to co-locate the project team (Lepore et al., 2012). Informal
learning can transpire simply by being located near other members of the project team.
Employees and leadership should accept that failures and mistakes occur but are
acceptable in rapid acquisitions as long as the lessons learned are spread throughout the
community and not repeated. Technology advances from failed programs can be
leveraged in future systems. Lastly, employees should understand the goals of the client
or war-fighter and design their system, schedule, budget, and risk acceptance level
accordingly. Each project should have a different mindset based on the customer’s
requirements.
Tiny
The Tiny value is predominantly the lowest ranked FIST value and among the
least emphasized activities. The Tiny value does not appear to be as well-designed and
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comprehensive as the other values. This leaves the possibility for much improvement. In
fact, with the correct additions, Tiny could be the key to the FIST model.
The most important activity, when starting a project, is to gather the requirements
from the customer. Requirements shape the project and provide guidance. This activity
is not present in the FIST model. If a customer needs a rapid capability, they should first
meet with the exploitation team to develop concrete requirements. Often customers are
unaware of the realistic technology available and what capabilities they truly need to
satisfy the mission. It will be the job of the exploitation team to develop realistic
requirements in face-to-face meetings with the customer, using only technology deemed
mature by the exploration team. The requirements should be linked to capabilities in an
operational context. The requirements should not focus on encompassing a specific
technology. The end product may be hampered if specific technology is specified than if
the design was left open for the project team to develop as they see fit. Once a minimum
set of capability-based requirements are developed, the project team needs to lock the
requirements in and fight any unfeasible changes or additions to the requirements.
Changing requirements once design progress is underway, destabilizes and weakens the
scope of the project. Scope creep negatively impacts cost, schedule, and performance by
altering the direction and design of the program. The program team should frequently
validate requirements with the customer because mistakes become more expensive the
further in development they are realized.
As Lepore et al. (2012) states, rapid programs typically produce 80% solutions or
less. This is advantageous in rapid acquisitions because there is not enough time to
satisfy all of the customer’s needs. Project teams could spend months and millions of
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dollars chasing the last 20% of a solution. At this point, the law of diminishing returns
takes effect. Showing the customer the drastic decrease in cost and schedule associated
with developing the 80% solution, generally receives wholehearted approval. If the
customer requires a solution greater than 80%, perhaps their need is not as urgent, and
they should meet with the exploration team to develop future technology to meet their
capability in the five to ten year timeframe.
Incremental development plays a role with developing a customer approved
solution. Similar to the A-10 Thunderbolt II program, the project team can present the
customer with different technology packages along with the cost and time associated with
developing each. A rapid system can reach the battlefield with the promise of upgrades
being included in the future to increase the capability to meet the user’s requirements.
Initial war-fighter feedback can shape and direct future upgrades in a direction different
than originally planned.
The last recommendation is to manage the technical debt. Technical debt is
accumulated as more and more immature technology is designed into the system. The
team must, at some point in the future, rework the configuration of the system to
accommodate the unknown final form of the technology. The advantage to technical debt
is postponing uncertain decisions to the future when they may be better understood. The
disadvantage is that if too much uncertainty is left to the end of the program, the project
may fail or never reach production. It is recommended that if a program is pushing the
technological boundary with a specific subsystem, such as the V-22 Osprey’s tilt-rotor
capability, the beyond state-of-the-art technology should be limited to that single area. A
single innovation is manageable by using the tools and techniques described. However,
117

if the program attempts to invent advancements throughout the project, the system will
never reach completion and the mounting risks will halt the progress until failure ensues.
Conclusion
The FIST model and the FIST-AHP model scrutinize projects solely based on
their development process. If a project receives a high FIST score, this only means that
the development resembled the FIST framework. The FIST score has no bearing on the
operational success of the program. Furthermore, programs could achieve developmental
success and not follow the FIST model because FIST is not the only feasible rapid
acquisition model. A true measure of success for the FIST model would be how close
FIST developmental success corresponds to operational success. If a development model
does not consistently produce operationally successful programs, the model is worthless.
Merely being able to replicate FIST results utilizing AHP is not as strong of an indicator
of the FIST model’s usefulness. As witnessed in this analysis, high scoring FIST
programs can fail operationally and low scoring FIST programs can succeed.
Ward’s (2009) original thesis results were able to be replicated by the FIST-AHP
model. This is not surprising because the FIST-AHP model is based on the FIST rubric.
Therefore, programs that scored well based on the FIST rubric correspondingly scored
well in the FIST-AHP model. The true value of this comparison is in finding program
characteristics that determine if a program is a good or poor fit for being developed by
FIST.
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The four characteristics of a program that are appropriate for FIST development are:





Urgent Need Capabilities
Budget Constrained Programs
Repeated Programs
Not Advancing Technology

The four program characteristics that emerged that show FIST as an inappropriate
method of development are:





Large Systems
Inherently Expensive
First-of-a-Kind Programs
Advancing Technology

Next, the experiment results produced a ranking of the 18 FIST activities in order
of importance by each project management group. There are distinct disconnects
between the military and civilian project managers, as well as leaders and non-leaders.
These results present many challenges, and although civilians complete different ventures
than military project managers, civilians must be proficient in order to remain profitable.
Private industry organizations will not bid on a job if a profit cannot be made on the
project. This is a luxury the military is not afforded. Next, if leaders are developing
overall strategies but this vision is not being translated and pursued by non-leaders, the
organization is going to fail. Both parties must work together to understand the upper
management view of project management as well as the daily, practical side of running a
program.
The seven project management groups produced rankings that highlighted poor
FIST activities. The Tiny activities were not valued nor understood as clearly as the other
values. Overall, System capability less than previous systems is the most confusing
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activity for respondents and was consistently ranked low. In response to these criticisms,
the following activities are proposed to be added to the FIST framework to account for
weak areas.
Inexpensive


Importance of Low Lifecycle Cost Solutions

Simple





Generational Development
Ambidextrous Organization (Exploring and Exploiting Structures)
Empowered, Co-located Employees
Manage to the Customer’s Goals (Schedule, Budget, Risk)

Tiny







Small, Handpicked, Experienced Team
Maintain Stable, Realistic, Needs-Based Requirements
Face-to-Face Requirements Agreement with Customer
Minimize Scope Creep / Additional Requirements
Strive for 80% Solution
Minimize Technical Debt

These additions to FIST will organize the program office into an ambidextrous,
dual structure. The exploring team develops and matures technology. The exploiting
team works with the customer to develop requirements and produces a system utilizing
only technology regarded as mature by the exploring team. Next, develop upfront,
realistic requirements with the customer that are traced to capabilities. Stable, realistic
requirements will mean the difference in program success and failure. Last, utilize
incremental development to field the basic system rapidly with the future potential to be
upgraded and fully meet the users’ needs. System operation may be different once it is
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used on the battlefield. Incremental development allows flexibility to gauge the amount
of improvement that is actually needed to perform the tasks.
DoD acquisitions have reached a crossroads where manning and funding are
drastically being reduced, yet the war-fighter needs remain the same. The only way to
survive this changing climate is to adapt to a new way of doing business. FIST is one
rapid acquisition model that seeks to be the solution. By combining FIST with the
recommendations presented in the research, as well as the conclusions resulting from
other rapid development studies, a well-rounded successful model can be developed. The
solutions do not lie with more oversight, bloated budgets, or increased manning. It is in
the best interest of the DoD to correct the current system by following a rapid
acquisitions model that substantially reduces the development time and accepts risks and
failures. All rapid programs will not be successes, but with smaller schedules and
budgets, the failures will not be catastrophic or insurmountable.
Future Research
This research produced the first intensive theory-testing empirical study of FIST.
Multiple theory-building and theory-testing empirical studies are required to support the
scientific basis of FIST as well as generalize its use for a wider range of acquisition
programs. This research produced program entry criteria for the use of FIST in
development and 11 additional FIST activities. A theory-building empirical study can be
completed merging FIST with the recommendations in this research as well as testing the
FIST entry criteria. Furthermore, a statistical analysis of the results found in this research
could be completed to evaluate convergent and discriminate validity as well as the
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reliability of the FIST measures themselves. Much of the recent FIST literature has been
completed by Ward and used as exposure and promotion of the model. Very little
research has been published that examines and improves the model.
Some of the best lessons learned about FIST were from the informal feedback
project managers included with the experiment. Feedback was not solicited in the
experiment but proved to be enlightening when provided. Future researchers could
conduct interviews with experienced project managers. The interviews should focus on
successful rapid development activities to further refine the framework. The participants
could be from different areas of development including space, material, defense
contractors, and civilian projects. This could help generalize the theory to be usable in a
variety of programs.
Further analysis into ambidextrous organizations, requirements gathering
techniques, and incremental development could be accomplished to expand these ideas
into the FIST model. These three areas proved to be weak or missing areas in the original
FIST model and important activities in rapid acquisitions. Providing a more specific
framework for FIST could help establish the philosophy as more usable. Many project
managers commented that FIST was too vague if they were to attempt to use it on their
next project. If the values Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny are supposed to direct
programs during development, there should be tools and techniques on how to do so.
Also, programs were proven to be FISTy and operational failures. Unless it can be
proven that FIST run programs can produce operationally successful programs, there is
little chance the DoD will adapt the model.

122

Overall, FIST is a starting point that requires additional research into rapid
acquisition best practices. As is, FIST is certainly not strong enough to be the cure-all for
the acquisition woes. However, it is undoubtedly a step in the right direction to improve
DoD spending and project development because it questions the status quo and aims to
prevent complacency. The better the FIST concept can be explained and understood, the
better chance project managers will direct future projects under the FIST banner and
produce actual FIST managed programs for future studies to examine.
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Appendix A: FIST Rubric (Ward, 2009:106-107)
FIST Rubric
!High
10 PIS
Strong, •'l'licit
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Good
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jcouc:rete steps taken to
actually reduce
~evelopment timeline.
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5 PIS
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0 PIS
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speed.
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Active-attempts to
educe-timeline or
increase timeline-.
Contractual
eward on-time I
incentives to reward arly delivery.
Accepts schedule
on-time delivery.
delays rather than
aooept risks.
~ew steps taken to
educe-timeline.

"-ccepts significant
!risks in order to
~iutain schedule-.

:1\.ccepts moderate
risks in order to
maintain schedule
Strong,
•'l'licit
Modest,
occasional
lnexp ensin
affirmation
of
the
ffirmation
of the
l s Good
~ortance- of low-cost. ~ortance- of lowost, with caveats.
!Formal c.o mmitment to
Modest, informal
!maintain budget
contractual, etc)
ommitment to
maintain or reducejcontrac.tual incentives udget.
o reward c.ost \utderew concrete steps
!nms.
aken to reduce cost.
jcoucrete steps taken to
ac-tually reduce
:1\.ccepts moderate
~evelopment c.ost.
risks in order to
maintain costs.
"-ccepts significant
!risks in order to reduce
kosts.
M_?dest, occasional
Simple l s Strong, •'l'licit and
~equent affirmation of ffirmation of the
Good
~ importance of
~ortance- of
simplicity.
simplicity, with
aveats.
!Deliberate-steps taken
o actually reduceModest attempts to
educe complexity in
komplexiiv in mauv
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ittle-to no mention Ambivalence or
of the importmce of antipathy towards
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Appendix B: Project Scores and Grades (Ward, 2009:61)

System Name
NASA Pathfinder Mission
F-16 Falcon
NASA NEAR Mission
Skunkworks
Pave Low Ill
P-51 Mustang
F-5 Freedom Fighter
A-1 0 Thunderbolt
F-20 Tigershark
AD Skyraider
XP-75 Eagle
MRAP
E-3 Sentry (AWACS)
NASA Viking Mission
C-5 Galaxy
Crusader Artillery
F-15 Eagle
V-22 Osprey
F-22 Raptor
RH-66 Comanche
Future Imagery Architecture
Division Air Defense (DIVAD)

F-Score

I.Score

s-score

10
10
10
10
10
10
5
10
5
10
10
10
5
0
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5

10
10
10
10
10
5
10
10
10
5
10
0
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
5
0
-5
-5
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
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T-Score FIST Score Outcom e
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
10
5
0
0
0
0
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5

40
40
40
40
40
35
35
35
35
30
25
15
5
-10
-15
-15

-20
-20
-20
-20
-20
-20

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
A
F
A
A
A
A
F
A
A
F
F
F
F

Appendix C: Experiment Directions
DIRECTIONS
-Please fill out the BLUE cells in the attached Excel spreadsheet based on your
experience and judgment in project management. There are 2 TABS to complete (Tab 1
and Tab 2).
-Select the appropriate cell and use the drag-down menu in each BLUE cell to select your
ranking.
-Two activities will be presented, a “Green Activity” and a “Red Activity”. Rank your
preference of the Green Activity over the Red Activity in respect to importance to
successful acquisition system development and delivery. Only judge the two activities
compared to each other and do not let previous judgments influence your decision. The
below table describes the rankings:
Value

Definition

1

Equal Importance Between Green Activity and Red Activity

3

Moderate Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

5

Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

7

Very Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

9

Extreme Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

2,4,6,8

Intermediate Values Between the two Adjacent Judgments

1/9, 1/8,
If Red Activity is more Important than the Green Activity, Use the
1/7, 1/6,
Reciprocal (Fraction) Value
1/5, 1/4,
Example: (1/9 = Red Activity Extreme Importance over the Green Activity)
1/3, 1/2

1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2

Red Activity Most Important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Equal Importance Green Activity Most Important
Example

The BLUE cell below would be read: Hamburger is _______ favorable to Pizza. In
the BLUE cell, you would select the “down arrow” to select your rank. If you highly
prefer Hamburgers, you would select 7, 8, or 9. If you highly prefer Pizza, you would
select 1/7, 1/8, or 1/9. If you prefer them equally, you would select 1.
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Appendix D: Experiment Tab 1
Red Activity
INEXPENSIVE

SIMPLE

TINY

FAST

DIRECTIONS

Green
INEXPENSIVE
Activity

Please Complete the 9 Blue Cells. See
Below for Definitions

SIMPLE

Number of Years Experience in Project Management?
Have you ever been in an Official Leadership Position?
What is/was your highest Rank while in Project Mgmt?

Value

Definition

1

Equal Importance Between Green Activity and Red Activity

3

Moderate Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

5

Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

7

Very Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

9

Extreme Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

2,4,6,8

Intermediate Values Between the two Adjacent Judgments

DEFINITIONS
Fast: Programs emphasize staying on schedule and maintaining deadlines.
Program managers seek short development timelines, incentivize contractors
for early delivery, and do not use schedule slips as an option.
Inexpensive: Programs pursue low-cost solutions and are willing to sacrifice
performance and accept risks to maintain cost / budget. Contractors are
incentivized for cost under runs.

1/9, 1/8,
If Red Activity is more Important than the Green Activity, Use the
1/7, 1/6,
Reciprocal (Fraction) Value
1/5, 1/4,
Example: (1/9 = Red Activity Extreme Importance over the Green Activity)
1/3, 1/2

Simple: Programs seek to reduce complexity in their developing technology,
design, documentation, and organization. The project focus is on a narrow set
of stable and attainable requirements utilizing existing technology to meet the
operational need rather than high-tech, complex solutions.
Tiny: Programs utilize small project teams, minimum documentation, and
develop smaller systems.

<Insert Green Activity>
is _____ Favorable to
<Insert Red Activity>
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Example (Cell D4):
Fast is __________
Favorable to Inexpensive

es to
ery

Appendix E: Experiment Tab 2

Red Activities

DIRECTIONS
Please Complete all the Blue Cells.

Accept risk to
reduce costs

Green Activities

Importance of Speed
Emphasis on the
(Project Pace, Schedule, importance of and
Deadlines)
reliance on talent

Concrete steps taken to actually
Contractual incentives to
reduce size of: (Project Team,
reward early delivery
Process, Documentation)

Importance of Simplicity
(Design, Organization,
Documentation)

Formal commitment to maintain or Concrete steps taken to
reduce size of: (Design,
actually reduce
Requirements, Technology)
development cost

Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)

Importance of Simplicity
(Design, Organization,
Documentation)

Formal commitment to maintain or Concrete steps taken to
reduce size of: (Design,
actually reduce
Requirements, Technology)
development cost

Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce
complexity in many areas (Technology,
Communication, Organization)

Concrete steps taken to actually reduce
development time

Formal commitment to
maintain deadlines

Heavy reliance on existing, mature,
proven technology (TRL 7+)

Value

Definition

1

Equal Importance Between Green Activity and Red Activity

3

Moderate Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

5

Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

7

Very Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

9

Extreme Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity

2,4,6,8

Intermediate Values Between the two Adjacent Judgments

Importance of Small (Design, Minimum Accept risk in order to Contractual incentives to reward
Documentation, Current Technology)
maintain schedule
cost under-runs

1/9, 1/8,
If Red Activity is more Important than the Green Activity, Use the
1/7, 1/6,
Reciprocal (Fraction) Value
1/5, 1/4,
Example: (1/9 = Red Activity Extreme Importance over the Green Activity)
1/3, 1/2
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System capability less than
previous systems (Design
Optimized for Single Task)

Importance of low-cost (Choosing a
Low Cost Design / Solution)

<Insert Green Activity>
is _____ Favorable to
<Insert Red Activity>

Example (Cell D4):
Formal Commitment to
Maintain Budget
is __________ Favorable to
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost

Deliberate steps taken to actually redu
complexity in many areas (Technolog
Communication, Organization)

Appendix F: Alternatives Analysis
Each mission is analyzed according to each of the 18 FIST activities and receives
a Poor, Average, Good, or Excellent rating. The rating is based on how well the program
incorporated the activity in the development and not necessarily the outcome. A large
portion of this alternatives analysis builds off the examination already completed by Dan
Ward in his 2009 AFIT thesis.
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NASA VIKING MISSION
Sources:

-McCurdy, 2001
-NASA Case Study: Searching for Life on Mars
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Poor: Used redundancy to mitigate risk. “Viking was a classic NASA mission: complex,
redundant and expensive” (McCurdy, 2001:61).
“The Viking team was committed to taking as much time as necessary to ensure optimal
performance and minimize risks on this very difficult mission” (Ward, 2009:169).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Poor: “By 1971 Viking’s launch date had already been pushed back from 1973 to 1975
due to Congressional budget cuts” (NASA Case Study:1).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Poor: “It didn’t help that Viking was running well over initial planning estimates for the
mission to Mars” (NASA Case Study:1).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
None found.
Importance of Speed
Poor: “The Pathfinder team, moreover, was asked to design, build, and prepare their
spacecraft for launch in just 3 years. The Viking team had taken 6” (McCurdy, 2001:61).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Poor: “When the project began, Viking managers estimated that the imaging system
could be designed and built for $6.2 million. The actual cost ($27.3 million) was 4 times
that amount” (McCurdy, 2001:70).
Importance of Low-Cost
Poor: “NASA officials originally estimated that they could develop the biology package
for $11.3 million. The actual cost was $59.5 million” (McCurdy, 2001:72).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
None Found.
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Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Poor: “When the project began, Viking managers estimated that the imaging system
could be designed and built for $6.2 million. The actual cost ($27.3 million) was 4 times
that amount” (McCurdy, 2001:70).
“NASA officials originally estimated that they could develop the biology package for
$11.3 million. The actual cost was $59.5 million” (McCurdy, 2001:72).
“[the Viking’s computer’s] cost grew from $3.4 to $28.1 million” (McCurdy, 2001:74).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Poor: Used expensive solutions instead of accepting any risk. “Viking team members
designed an elaborate landing system, with computers, parachutes, radar altimeters, and a
throttleable rocket engine. They developed a redundant radio communication system…”
(McCurdy, 2001:65).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Poor: “The Viking landers had more capability than the Pathfinder spacecraft”
(McCurdy, 2001:68).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Poor: Simple designs proposed were rejected in favor of complex solutions. “The
technical challenges for Viking were no less daunting than the fiscal ones. Nobody had
landed on Mars before, so the spacecraft itself required significant innovative technology.
The opportunity to conduct experiments on the planet’s surface led to an extremely
ambitious scientific agenda featuring thirteen instruments” (NASA Case Study:1).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Poor: “Scientists recommended that project engineers incorporate a simpler design with
less capability… The technically sophisticated design was retained” (McCurdy, 2001:71).
Importance of Simplicity
Poor: Complex designs and solutions were preferred.
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
No explicit comments found but mission was successful and completed a difficult task.
TINY
Importance of Small
Poor: “The biology package weighed 33 pounds and contained 40,000 parts” (McCurdy,
2001:72).
“The Viking cameras were bulky affairs… Each lander had two” (McCurdy, 2001:70).
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Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Poor: “The only way to pack four experiments into a small, lightweight container was to
make the package complex. In an instrument this complex, any single-point failure
threatened the whole system” (McCurdy, 2001:72).
“The computer on the Viking lander weighed 52 pounds… The Viking lander required 17
times as much electric power as the Pathfinder lander” (McCurdy, 2001:74).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Poor: “The Viking project, at the height of its activity, employed 538 people at the
Langley Research Center, 1,650 people at the Martin Marietta Aerospace Center, an
unknown number of people at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and 69 scientists on 13
advisory teams” (McCurdy, 2001:75).
OUTCOME
Success: “The program was clearly successful, as Viking operated for years in one of the
most difficult environments NASA has ever attempted” (Ward, 2009:169)
“Although the resulting images were spectacular, Viking program managers paid for this
decision with substantial cost overruns” (McCurdy, 2001:71).
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NASA PATHFINDER MISSION
Sources:

-McCurdy, 2001
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Excellent: “Simplicity demanded that the team be willing to take risks that are not
common on interplanetary missions” (Ward, 2009:115).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Excellent: “The Pathfinder team, moreover, was asked to design, build and prepare their
spacecraft for launch in just 3 years. The Viking team had taken 6” (McCurdy, 2001:61).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Excellent: “To leave time for testing, Spear insisted that contractors and subsystem
managers deliver their hardware no later than halfway through the development cycle.
This was a demanding requirement inasmuch as the development phase had already been
cut to just three years” (McCurdy, 2001:130).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
Poor: “No evidence was presented that contractual incentives were made to deliver on
time” (Ward, 2009:114).
Importance of Speed
Excellent: “Within aerospace circles, the cost and schedule goals given to the Pathfinder
team were widely thought to be impossible” (McCurdy, 2001:61).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Excellent: “The Viking team spent $27.3 million to develop the cameras for their landers,
approximately $100 million in inflation-adjusted dollars. The Pathfinder team spent just
$7.4 million” (McCurdy, 2001:70).
“Proponents of the ‘faster, better, cheaper’ initiative asked the Pathfinder team to put a
lander and a rover on the surface of Mars for one-fourteenth of the inflation-adjusted cost
of the 1976 Viking mission” (McCurdy, 2001:61).
Importance of Low-Cost
Excellent: “They called it ‘Pathfinder’ because the project blazed the trail for a new
generation of low-cost spacecraft” (McCurdy, 2001:62).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
None Found

134

Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Excellent: “The Pathfinder team clearly saved money by reducing capability” (McCurdy,
2001:69).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Excellent: “To further reduce mission costs, the Pathfinder team accepted risks that
Viking team members had been unwilling to endure” (McCurdy, 2001:65).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Excellent: “The Pathfinder team clearly saved money by reducing capability” (McCurdy,
2001:69).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Excellent: “[Donna] Shirley promised to build a free-ranging rover and stay within
NASA’s $25 million cap. To avoid cost overruns, she relied heavily on existing
technology” (McCurdy, 2001:73).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Excellent: Sacrificed performance, and the number and type of instruments on the
mission to stay simple. The landing concept on an inflatable airbag was extremely
simpler than previous methods.
Importance of Simplicity
Excellent: “The concept for actually landing the Pathfinder on Mars is the paragon of
simplicity” (Ward, 2009:115).
“Inexpensive was the primary driver, and simplicity had to be enforced to bring the
program in on budget. Simplicity was implemented, but forced a reduction in capability”
(Ward, 2009:115).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
Average: No explicit comment but the team was collocated and could not solve problems
by pulling in more people or spending money. The team’s talent had to create solutions.
TINY
Importance of Small
Excellent: “Pathfinder was a small spacecraft, deliberately made so in order to fit on the
most inexpensive launch vehicle possible (Delta II)” (Ward, 2009:115).
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Excellent: “The Pathfinder development and operations teams were deliberately kept
small, with most of the development work done in-house at JPL. This allowed the team to
avoid hiring people to coordinate the dispersed activities and further reduced the size of
the management and advisory teams. The intentionally short duration and simple design
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of the mission allowed the operations team to be kept to a few dozen people” (Ward,
2009:115).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Excellent: “The Mars Pathfinder team also saved money by employing fewer people”
(McCurdy, 2001:74).
OUTCOME
Success: “The Pathfinder program’s embodiment of the FIST principles resulted in a
successful mission, according to the requirements and expectations. The team met its
budget, timeline, and mission parameters” (Ward, 2009:115).
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MRAP
Sources:

-Sullivan, 2008
-Jones, 2007
-Ward, 2009
-Sisk, 2012
-Rogers, 2012

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Good: “DOD recognized that no single vendor could provide all of the vehicles needed to
meet requirements quickly enough and invited vendors to offer their nondevelopmental
solutions” (Sullivan, 2008:5).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Excellent: The program also undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and
fielding the vehicles. To expand limited existing production capacity, the department
awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts to nine commercial
sources for the purchase of up to 4,100 vehicles per year from each vendor” (Sullivan,
2008:2).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Excellent: “DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP
vehicles” (Sullivan, 2008:2).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
Not explicitly mentioned: “The IDIQ contracts required these initial vehicles to be
produced within 60 days. However, in less than three weeks, five of the vendors
demonstrated their reliability to produce vehicles meeting Marine Corps survivability
requirements, production numbers and delivery timelines” (Jones, 2007).
Importance of Speed
Excellent: “DOD designated the MRAP program as DOD’s highest priority acquisition,
which helped contractors and other industry partners to more rapidly respond to the
urgent need…” (Sullivan, 2008:2).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Poor: “The cost for individual production models of the MRAP ranged from $535,000 to
$600,000, but field models including spare parts and upgrades came to an average of
$1.29 million” (Sisk, 2012).
Importance of Low-Cost
Poor: “To date, more than $22 billion has been appropriated to acquire more than 15,000
MRAP vehicles…” (Sullivan, 2008:1).
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Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
Average: “…using 9 different IDIQ contracts could foster competition between vendors,
which is precisely the kind of thing a project leader would do to express the Inexpensive
value” (Ward, 2009:162).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Poor: “MRAP leaders emphasized speed and sacrificed cost, potentially driving up costs
to a greater degree than necessary” (Ward, 2009:161).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Poor: “MRAP leaders emphasized speed and sacrificed cost, potentially driving up costs
to a greater degree than necessary” (Ward, 2009:161).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Good: Utilized commercially available components and a not complex technology.
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Good: “…relied heavily on commercially available products” (Sullivan, 2008:2).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Good: “DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP
vehicles. The program established minimal operational requirements and relied heavily
on commercially available products” (Sullivan, 2008:2).
Importance of Simplicity
Average: “Unfortunately, the vendors are not working from a common blueprint and each
type of MRAP is different from the others, making maintenance and operations slightly
more complicated” (Ward, 2009:162).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
Good: “…invited vendors to offer their nondevelopmental solutions” (Sullivan, 2008:5).
TINY
Importance of Small
Poor: “Five versions of the MRAP were produced, weighing from 13–28 tons” (Sisk,
2012).
“Back in 2007, General Jim Conway, then the Marine commandant, questioned the need
for so many of the heavy vehicles. “Those vehicles weigh 40,000 pounds each in the
larger category,’ he said. ‘Frankly, you can’t put them in a helicopter and you can’t even
put them aboard ship.’ As for their use after these wars? ‘Wrap them in shrink wrap and
put them in asphalt somewhere is about the best thing that we can describe at this point,’
he said. ‘And as expensive as they are, that is probably not a good use of the taxpayers’
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money’.” (Rogers, 2012).
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Poor: “27,740 MRAPs rolled off the assembly lines of seven manufacturers” (Sisk,
2012).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Good: Reduced acquisition process for rapid acquisition of vehicle.
OUTCOME
Mixed: “MRAPs with their V-shaped, blast-deflecting hulls are ‘one of the most
important acquisitions to come off the line since World War II,’ [Deputy Defense
Secretary Ash] Carter said. It is, he added, the Defense Department’s most important
program ‘in the last decade’.” (Rogers, 2012).
“The $47.7 billion era of the MRAP came to an official close Monday [1 October 2012]”
(Sisk, 2012).
“Marine Lt. Gen. Richard Mills testified that ‘The Marine Corps has a little over 4,000 of
them. We intend, as we come out of Afghanistan, to retain about 2,500’.” (Sisk, 2012).
“In 2010, USA Today reported that MRAPs cut casualties from 2000 to 2010 by 30%,
perhaps saving dozens of lives each month. In 2011, the Pentagon MRAP shop estimated
that MRAPs saved up to a stunning 40,000 lives — 10,000 in Iraq and 30,000
Afghanistan” (Rogers, 2012).
“Chris Rohlfs and Ryan Sullivan wrote in Foreign Affairs that ‘the heavily-protected
vehicles were no more effective at reducing casualties than the medium armored
vehicles.’ And the MRAPs are ‘three times as expensive as medium protected vehicles’.”
(Rogers, 2012).
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P-51 MUSTANG
Sources:

-Baugher, 2012
-Bjarnoe, 2006
-Carson, 1985
-Nelson, 1944
-Saunders, 1942
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Good: Implicit that risk was accepted rather than creating a schedule delay in order to
maintain delivery agreement of September 1941.
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Excellent: “… North American promised to deliver 320 of the new aircraft before
September 1941, only 17 months after the signing of the agreement…” (Carson,
1985:33).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Excellent: “… when developing the P-51 a kind of modularization and parallelization of
the sub-processes was applied. The airframe was for example divided into sections which
could be developed independently as the interfaces were defined from the beginning
which is the same principle used in contemporary modular product-architectures. This
made it possible to execute parallel product development and set-based design, which
means that several designs of the same module were developed concurrently and
consequently the decision about the final design could be postponed. The result of this
made it possible to work with new, advanced designs in a very limited time frame”
(Bjarnoe, 2006:44).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
None Found
Importance of Speed
Excellent: “The P-51 was designed and built in 117 days” (Ward, 2009:136).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Average: “…the Mustang’s economy is an implicit value rather than an explicit” (Ward,
2009:137).
Importance of Low-Cost
Good: “…the Mustang is consistently described in terms of its ‘economy of operation,’
and praised for being ‘economical to produce’.” (Ward, 2009:136).
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Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
None Found
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Good: “The record of North American’s P-51 Mustang fighter proves, however, that it is
both possible and practical to create a single basic design that can be modified, as
military needs dictate, to keep abreast of requirements.” (Nelson, 1944:127)
“…does not to any extent embody previously unknown engineering features, but rather
employed refinements of known accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Good: “During the P-51B-10-NA and P-51C-1-NT production run, it was decided to omit
the olive drab camouflage and to deliver the aircraft in their natural metal finish. The
objective was now to try and bring the Luftwaffe into battle, not to hide from it. This
move saved extra cost, weight, and drag” (Baugher, 2012).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Excellent: “These achievements are, from an engineering standpoint, remarkable—
because they were accomplished by a plane that does not to any extent embody
previously unknown engineering features, but rather employed refinements of known
accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Excellent: “…does not to any extent embody previously unknown engineering features,
but rather employed refinements of known accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Excellent: “The record of North American’s P-51 Mustang fighter proves, however, that
it is both possible and practical to create a single basic design that can be modified, as
military needs dictate, to keep abreast of requirements” (Nelson, 1944:127).
Importance of Simplicity
Excellent: “It is an extremely simple airplane and has such perfect handling qualities as to
put a smile of joy on the face of any fighter pilot” (Sanders, 1942).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
None found but due to the success of the project, the team must have relied on talent to
maintain the performance and schedule constraints.
TINY
Importance of Small
Excellent: “The P-51 is requested in preference to the P-47 because of its smaller size,
ease of maintenance, economy of operation, range and because many of the accessories
for it are already available in this area [Karachi Air Base, India]” (Sanders, 1942).
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Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Excellent: “The problem of supply of a new airplane is not as great as it first seems due to
the fact that engines, guns, radios, instruments, and man [sic] other parts are the same as
those used on P-40s” (Sanders, 1942).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Excellent: “…the P-51 could be maintained easily with existing supplies and tools”
(Ward, 2009:136).
“… they already had a clear idea of what they wanted and… they used the data from
Curtis… to cut trial and error time and to find tune their own concept of what a modern
fighter should be” (Carson, 1985:33).
OUTCOME
Success: “The P-51 Mustang is one of the most famous and successful fighter aircraft of
the WWII era, both operationally and programmatically. It was an engineering, logistical
and operational success, and sets an example we would do well to follow even today”
(Ward, 2009:135-136).
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XP-75 EAGLE
Sources:

-Holley, 1987
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Excellent: “One can only speculate that it was the urgent necessity of getting a superior
fighter into production as rapidly as possible that led to the experiment” (Holley,
1987:592).
“To make matters worse, the Allison engine, which had been rushed into production
before it was thoroughly debugged, was not performing up to expectations…” (Holley,
1987:590).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Poor: “When air force [sic] officers estimated that it would take at least six months to
eliminate these problems, pushing the projected date for reaching peak production past
the middle of 1945, it was clear that the time had come to kill the whole project” (Holley,
1987:591).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Excellent: “… the air force [sic] took steps to shorten the delays—first, by increasing the
number of experimental models to be procured from two to eight to be sure there would
be a sufficient number to carry out exhaustive flight tests, and second, by issuing a letter
of intent to contract for a mass-production order for 2,500 P-75’s” (Holley, 1987:588).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
Poor: Cost Plus Fixed Fee contract (Holley, 1987:587).
Importance of Speed
Excellent: “Deliveries were expected to begin by May 1944, approximately nine months
hence, a phenomenally short time for such a complex undertaking” (Holley, 1987:588).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Average: “Total cost of the production contract was estimated at $325 million with a unit
cost of approximately $100,000” (Holley, 1987:588).
Importance of Low-Cost
Average: “… the Materiel Command signed a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for two
experimental fighters, XP-75, at the relatively modest estimated cost of $428,271, for
delivery in six months” (Holley, 1987:587).
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Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
Average: “…a fixed fee of no more than $75,163 or 2.65 percent of the original estimated
total, a figure well below the usual 4 or 5 percent fee” (Holley, 1987:589).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Good: “Only the main fuselage itself would have to be developed anew. By such shortcuts, the plane was expected to be ready for flight testing in six months” (Holley,
1987:587).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Good: “In September 1941, the corporation [General Motors] approached Maj Gen O.P.
Echols, the commanding general of Materiel Command, with a proposal to develop a
fighter aircraft in a remarkably short time by using, as far as possible, structures, controls,
and accessories already in full production for other aircraft in order to obviate the need
for long delays in tooling up for production” (Holley, 1987:587).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Average: “Project leaders severely underestimated the complexity involved with
integrating pieces of existing airframes into a new airframe. Each of those pieces had
been optimized for the original aircraft, and most had to be modified before they could be
used on the P-75. The designers seemed to have aimed for simplicity but instead achieved
simplisticness” (Ward, 2009:158).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Excellent: “Only the main fuselage itself would have to be developed anew. By such
short-cuts, the plane was expected to be ready for flight testing in six months” (Holley,
1987:587).
“… more and more evidence emerged to indict the whole scheme to use off-the-shelf
stock components to build a superior high-performance aircraft” (Holley, 1987:591).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Good: “…structures, controls, and accessories already in full production for other aircraft
in order to obviate the need for long delays in tooling up for production” (Holley,
1987:587).
Importance of Simplicity
Good: “By enlarging the tail surface, most of the apparent instability could be overcome,
but this meant it would no longer be possible to use the ready-built, off-the-shelf stock
design already in production…” (Holley, 1987:590).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
None Found
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TINY
Importance of Small
Poor: “Each such modification added weight…” (Holley, 1987:590).
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Poor: “Echol’s espousal of the XP-75 is all the more curious in view of the massive size
of the plane. With its 49-foot wingspan, it was substantially heavier than virtually any
other successful World War II fighter” (Holley, 1987:592).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Poor: “The remedy, eventually devised, was to extend the ailerons out to the wingtips to
insure greater stability and control. But this, too, required reworking the standard readybuilt wings…” (Holley, 1987:590).
OUTCOME
Failure: “Every new model aircraft has bugs which have to be ironed out; this was to be
expected. But the faults encountered in the XP-75 were more than minor. The test pilot
reported that the plane lacked stability and displayed a distressing tendency to stall and
spin when making tight turns, the maneuver most essential to fighter aircraft” (Holley,
1987:589).
“On October 4, 1944, the chief of air staff, Lt. Gen. B.M. Giles, signed the order
terminating the contract” (Holley, 1987:591).
“The XP-75 / P-75 Eagle project failed to deliver the promised performance, and so the
project was cancelled shortly before World War II ended” (Ward, 2009:157).
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V-22 OSPREY
Sources:

-Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008
-Thompson, 2007
-Thompson, 2011
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Poor: “Probes into the deadly 2000 crashes revealed that in a rush to deploy the aircraft,
the Marines had dangerously cut corners in their testing program. The number of
different flight configurations… flown by test pilots to ensure safe landings was reduced
by half to meet deadlines. Then only two-thirds of those curtailed flight tests were
conducted” (Thompson, 2007:3).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Poor: “… the V-22 has been 25 years in development, more than twice as long as the
Apollo program that put men on the moon” (Thompson, 2007:1).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Poor: “Not only did the project take 25 years to deliver an operational capability, but in
the few instances when project leaders attempted to accelerate the project, they did so by
cutting corners on flight tests” (Ward, 2009:183).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
None Found
Importance of Speed
Poor: 25 year development
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Poor: “It wasn’t about saving a bunch of money – it was about doing it” (Ward,
2009:181).
Importance of Low-Cost
Poor: “The aircraft is currently five times more expensive than the system it replaces…”
(Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:24).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
Poor: “There is also no evidence project leaders embraced the Inexpensive value” (Ward,
2009:183).
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Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Poor: “The Pentagon has put $20 billion into the Osprey and expects to spend an
additional $35 billion before the program is finished. In exchange, the Marines, Navy and
Air Force will get 458 aircraft, averaging $119 million per copy” (Thompson, 2007:1).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
None Found
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Poor: “It is intended to execute a variety of missions for the Marine Corps, the Navy and
the Air Force, including troop and equipment transport, amphibious assault, search and
rescue, and special operations” (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:24).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Poor: “Simpler, mature alternatives are available, such as the EH-101” (Ward,
2009”184).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Poor: “…the Osprey is not a simple machine, and there is no evidence the project leaders
valued Simplicity” (Ward, 2009:184).
Importance of Simplicity
Poor: “It was very organizationally complex initially, which led to communication
troubles” (Ward, 2009:181).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
None Found
TINY
Importance of Small
Poor: “The Osprey is also three times heavier than the helicopter it replaces” (Cordesman
& Kaeser, 2008:24).
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Poor: “Throughout its development, however, the V-22 enjoyed broad and persistent
congressional support. The V-22 program has nearly 2,000 suppliers in over 40 states and
created jobs in 276 congressional districts” (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:26).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Average: “… the Navy and Marine Corps reduced some requirements to allow the
aircraft to reach operational readiness” (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:25).
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OUTCOME
Success: “But as Osprey backers point out, the V-22 can also do more than a
conventional helicopter, so much more that there is a credible case it actually is more
cost-effective. That case is especially compelling in scenarios where the current searchand-rescue fleet would have trouble reaching distressed pilots in a timely fashion”
(Thompson, 2011).
“…the V-22 is the only aircraft in the world that can fly as far and fast as a turboprop
airplane, and then hover or land like a helicopter. Within 90 minutes the downed pilot
was safely retrieved, opening a new chapter in the expanding chronicle of Osprey
successes. The V-22s used in the Libyan rescue mission had been sent to the
Mediterranean from a Marine unit operating in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, where
local commanders have praised the agility and resilience of the aircraft” (Thompson,
2011).
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E-3 SENTRY AWACS
Sources:

-Cowdery & Skillman, 1995
-GAO, 1973
-Grier, 2002
-Ulsamer, 1974
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Good: “…the AWACS test program focused on two key objectives from the very
beginning: To identify the most difficult task and to ensure that it is being tested early”
(Ulsamer, 1974:76).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Good: “On November 7, 1972, Boeing successfully completed the Airborne Tracking
Demonstration, 4 months ahead of schedule” (GAO, 1973:1).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Good: “Because of the ‘crash’ nature of the program, most of the system debugging
occurred at Boeing” (Cowdery & Skillman, 1995:5).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
None Found
Importance of Speed
Good: 11 year development. “The Brassboard radars were designed, fabricated, tested
and installed in the flight test aircraft at Boeing in less than two years… This was rather
incredible considering the complexity of the radar and instrumentation” (Cowdery &
Skillman, 1995:5).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Excellent: “… in January 1973, the approved program was based on a 4 engine rather
than an 8 engine configuration; had a program cost of $2,467 million, for a total
reduction of $194 million…” (GAO, 1973:2).
Importance of Low-Cost
Excellent: “As of January 19, 1973, the approved program cost estimate was reduced to
$2,467 million” (GAO, 1973:3).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
None Found
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Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Excellent: “… some reduction in time-on-station was more than made up for by the lower
cost of using TF33 engines already in the Air Force’s inventory in surplus quantities”
(Ulsamer, 1974:76).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Good: “Because of the success of the radar test program, it became possible to speed up
the AWACS test and evaluation schedule across the board” (Ulsamer, 1974:76).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Poor: “‘The total complexity of this system… far exceeds things I’ve worked on before,’
said Ed Froesse, Boeing’s vice president for the AWACS program” (Grier, 2002:5).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Excellent: “There is no compelling reason for lengthy airframe and engine testing
because the AWACS aircraft is a modified Boeing 707-320… AWACS engines are those
of the Air Force’s C-141, similarly proved in many years of service” (Ulsamer, 1974:70).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Good: “Budgetary constraints at the time of AWACS’s first DSARC in July 1970 caused
the Air Force to ‘trade down’ to a basic AWACS system…” (Ulsamer, 1974:76).
Importance of Simplicity
Average: “… the Pentagon treated development of the system as a high-priority effort.
For example, AWACS had its own streamlined procurement rules…” (Grier, 2002:2)
“…the aircraft’s avionics was often described as highly complex” (Ward, 2009:165).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
None Found
TINY
Importance of Small
Poor: Large project team, large aircraft crew requirement, large airframe, expanding to
NATO and allies.
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Average: “There is no compelling reason for lengthy airframe and engine testing because
the AWACS aircraft is a modified Boeing 707-320… AWACS engines are those of the
Air Force’s C-141, similarly proved in many years of service” (Ulsamer, 1974:70).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Good: “… in January 1973, the approved program was based on a 4 engine rather than an
8 engine configuration; had a program cost of $2,467 million, for a total reduction of
$194 million…” (GAO, 1973:2).
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OUTCOME
Success: “Twenty-five years ago, on March 24, 1977, Boeing delivered the first basic
production version of the E-3 Sentry to Air Force officials at Tinker AFB, Okla. The
ensuing quarter century has shown the AWACS to be indispensable, often the first
system to go into action when a threat arises and the last to leave once operations cease”
(Grier, 2002:1).
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RAH-66 COMANCHE
Sources:

-CBO, 1997
-Global Security, 2008
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Poor: No evidence of accepting risks to maintain schedule.
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Poor: “…the actual cost and schedule far exceeded estimates” (Ward, 2009:194).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Poor: “The helicopter is still in the development stage, which will continue at least
through 2004. As recently as 1992, the Army had planned to start buying Comanches in
1996, but it has since delayed the start of production until 2005” (CBO, 1997).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
None Found
Importance of Speed
Poor: “The first helicopter will be combat-ready in September 2009, three years behind
the previous schedule. Production and purchase of the first helicopters would begin in
fiscal 2006, one year later than planned under the previous schedule” (Global Security,
2008).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Poor: “The project was cancelled after spending nearly $7B over two decades” (Ward,
2009:194).
Importance of Low-Cost
Poor: “There is no evidence project leaders deemed it important to deliver a low-cost,
simple solution on a short timeline” (Ward, 2009:194).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
None Found
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Poor: “The new Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) formally approving the plan
added about $3.4 billion to the Comanche’s $3.1 billion development program” (Global
Security, 2008).

152

Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Poor: No evidence found that risks were accepted to reduce costs.
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Poor: “Skeptics of the program suggested that unmanned planes capable of performing
the Comanche’s surveillance and precision-strike role will be available to the Army prior
to the maturing of the Comanche system” (Global Security, 2008).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Poor: “…evidence suggests they were more than willing to sacrifice cost, schedule and
usability in order to ensure the Comanche’s technologies were cutting-edge, however
unproven or unreliable” (Ward, 2009:194).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Poor: Extremely complex program and design.
Importance of Simplicity
Poor: “According to the DOT&E, technical challenges remained for software integration
and testing of mission equipment, weight reduction, radar signatures, antenna
performance, gun system performance, and aided target detection algorithm
performance” (Global Security, 2008).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
None Found.
TINY
Importance of Small
Poor: Large aircraft, high level of technology, large project team.
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Poor: “Empty weight projections for Block I, II and III aircraft were slightly higher than
weight goals for each block” (Global Security, 2008).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Poor: No evidence found
OUTCOME
Failure: Program cancelled after 21 year development and $39 billion spent. Not a single
Comanche was produced.
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A-10 THUNDERBOLT II
Sources:

-Burton, 1993
-Jacques & Strouble, 2008
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Good: “The required IOC of December 1970 was considered high risk with respect to
cost and schedule, but achievable if the concept definition phase was reduced to a four
month contract definition followed by competitive source selection…” (Jacques &
Strouble, 2008:21).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Good: “The change to a competitive prototyping approach had a significant effect on
IOC, with the new projected IOC now in FY76” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:30).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Good: “The A-X request for proposal (RFP), including all attachments and ‘boiler plate’
was 104 pages, and it limited each contractor’s response to 585 pages. This represented a
sizeable reduction in the RFP for its time…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:32).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
Good: “Contractors would have 3 months to respond to the RFP and the government
intended to complete its evaluation of proposals and make award within a 75 day period”
(Jacques & Strouble, 2008:32).
Importance of Speed
Good: “The Air Force also believed the A-10 to be closer to production, thus allowing for
faster progress…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Good: “…the simpler design of the A-10 was more likely to allow achievement of the
$1.4M flyaway cost…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39).
Importance of Low-Cost
Excellent: “In a force cost analysis, the A-X had the lowest total force cost due to the
small force required, which could be traced to high availability over the battlefield, high
sortie rates and high sortie effectiveness” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:27).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
Excellent: “…with contractual incentives to achieve or come under the cost goal”
(Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39).
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“…the Air Force awarded a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for approximately $160M”
(Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Excellent: “In order to achieve cost savings, the specified performance requirements were
not to be considered firm specifications but goals…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:33).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Excellent: “The required IOC of December 1970 was considered high risk with respect to
cost and schedule, but achievable if the concept definition phase was reduced to a four
month contract definition followed by competitive source selection…” (Jacques &
Strouble, 2008:21).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Excellent: “The avionics for the A-X were specified in terms of a ‘skeleton’ package
(below minimum requirements), a ‘lean’ package (met only minimum requirements), and
three add-on packages that would supplement the ‘lean’ package” (Jacques & Strouble,
2008:20).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Excellent: “The A-X was to use an existing state-of-the-art engine in order to achieve an
early IOC [Initial Operating Capability]… The A-X would also use existing state-of-theart equipment for avionics” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:18).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Excellent: “In order to reduce these costs, the Air Force was to provide guidance
stressing simplicity of design, ease of maintenance, and the importance of keeping costs
of the A-X to a minimum” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:33).
Importance of Simplicity
Excellent: “… it was intended that simplicity of design would lead to a shorter
development time, lower life cycle cost, reduced maintenance times, increased sortie
rates and the ability to operate from austere bases” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:22).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
Average: Not explicitly stated however, the project team was small and had to rely on
talent to accomplish development.
“In keeping with the philosophy of minimum documentation for the Parallel
Undocumented Development phase, the SPO [System Program Office] was to be manned
on an austere basis” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:32).
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TINY
Importance of Small
Good: “The representative A-X from DCP-23A [Development Concept Paper] was
slightly smaller, lighter and cheaper than that of DCP-23” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:30).
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Good: “Dr. John Foster [DDR&E] stated that ‘the proposed aircraft seems to be too
large… A smaller, less-costly, quick reaction aircraft seems more appropriate” (Jacques
& Strouble, 2008:29).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Excellent: “In October 1969, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Seamans chose an
alternative that was termed ‘Parallel Undocumented Development.’ This approach would
require a minimal amount of documentation during the competitive prototyping phase to
encourage innovation and initiative on the part of the contractors” (Jacques & Strouble,
2008:30).
OUTCOME
Success: “The A-10s turned out to be one of the true success stories of the [first Gulf]
war. They represented only 15 percent of the combat aircraft in the war, yet, according to
the Air Force Times, ‘flew about a third of the total sorties and were responsible for more
than half the confirmed bomb damage’ against the enemy. Put another way, the A-10 was
responsible for more damage to the enemy than all the other combat aircraft put
together…” (Burton, 1993:242).
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F-20 TIGERSHARK
Sources:

-Martin & Schmidt, 1987
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Average: Rapid aircraft testing (Martin & Schmidt, 1987).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Excellent: “The rollout of the first F-20 Tigershark occurred 32 months after the program
go-ahead—it came out a month ahead of schedule” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:5).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Good: “Northrop rapidly tested the Tigershark through its flight envelope in order to
enable foreign air force pilots to fly the aircraft as soon as possible for marketing
reasons” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:6).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
None Found
Importance of Speed
Good: One month ahead of schedule (Martin & Schmidt, 1987).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Excellent: “The problem was to make this leap while still fielding a relatively
inexpensive aircraft, and one that maintained the old F-5 emphasis on reliability and
maintainability” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:2-3).
Importance of Low-Cost
Excellent: “The proposed fixed price for the F-20s was $15 million with support (1985
dollars), substantially less than GD’s going price of $18 million for the F-16C” (Martin &
Schmidt, 1987:17).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
None Found
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Excellent: “It is evident that from early on in the program, Northrop was concerned over
the cost-effective producibility of the Tigershark. They took great steps towards ensuring
that they would be able to produce a quality product that could be sold for a reasonable
price” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:9).
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Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Excellent: “Northrop management reasoned that the trend of electronic technical progress
in the 1970s, in general, had been more performance at less cost with greater
dependability…Northrop believed that they would be able to translate these advantages
of high technology into the advanced avionics systems of the F-20. The new aircraft
would have the extra capabilities associated with a ‘top of the line’ plane, but at less cost”
(Martin & Schmidt, 1987:3).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Average: “The FX program’s F-5G Tigershark had represented a significant leap forward
from the old F-5E in terms of technical sophistication and performance. The F-20
Tigershark would be going even further forward” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:3).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Good: “Northrop put these principles into practice by selecting F-20 subsystems which
were either proven, or which had good paper ‘specs’ with respect to reliability” (Martin
& Schmidt, 1987:4).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Excellent: “A corollary to the Northrop philosophy stated above is a willingness to give
up a little extra performance in order to make significant gains in terms of affordability,
reliability, maintainability, and operability” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:4).
Importance of Simplicity
Excellent: “Northrop’s export fighter program has been characterized by a consistent
philosophy. In designing and developing an aircraft, performance must not outweigh cost,
reliability, maintainability, and operability… Their typical client country hasn’t had the
kind of support structure to operate and maintain a ‘Ferrari’ level aircraft, but has done
well with a ‘Ford Escort’ aircraft” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:3).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
Good: Northrop challenged the team to build a fighter with 80 percent the capability of
the F-16 at half the price. The F-20 was a self-funded venture meant for foreign export
sales. They had to rely on their talent to make the program a success (Martin & Schmidt,
1987).
TINY
Importance of Small
Good: “Their typical client country hasn’t had the kind of support structure to operate and
maintain a ‘Ferrari’ level aircraft, but has done well with a ‘Ford Escort’ aircraft” (Martin
& Schmidt, 1987:3).
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Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Good: “…there was less documentation than what would have accompanied a
government sponsored program and the initial CEO design philosophy was kept to just
one page” (Ward, 2009:149).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Good: “…the redesigning of the production center to decrease the size and bureaucracy
of production” (Ward, 2009:149).
OUTCOME
Failure: “The F-20 program was a resounding failure—Northrop was not able to sell even
a single F-20. The Tigershark’s limited performance was certainly a contributing factor,
as was the change in U.S. policy on weapon exports. However, the primary reason
appears to be the striking mismatch between Northrop’s design values and the values of
its potential clients” (Ward, 2009:148).
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C-5 GALAXY
Sources:

-AF Studies Board, 2008
-Gregory, 1989
-Griffin, 2005
-Ward, 2009

FAST
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule
Average: “The SPO’s performance in exercising their responsibility to balance the
requirements with the design risk was less than stellar” (Griffin, 2005:20).
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines
Good: “…the whole process took seven years, starting with the early vision, to build the
program consensus, develop the budget plan, and define the requirements” (Griffin,
2005:16).
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time
Average: “The schedule manager presented a list of over 500 tasks that were to be
accomplished that week. The manager reported that all items were on track except for
some small number of items. Of the late items, most had been resolved and there was a
plan to finish the work and get back on schedule. For those unresolved items for which
there was no current work-around, the names of the engineers responsible for correcting
these problems were shown. On Thursday, the chief engineer visited the desks of the
engineers and all the problems had been resolved!” (Griffin, 2005:13).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery
Good: Fixed-Price, Incentive Fee Contract (Griffin, 2005:vii).
Importance of Speed
Average: “The first flight of the C-5A occurred on 28 June 1968, 33 months after
contract award” (Griffin, 2005:14).
INEXPENSIVE
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget
Poor: “The Air Force spent over $2 billion more than the original budget, and it took 10
years longer to finish the production with fewer aircraft than originally planned” (AF
Studies Board, 2008:38).
Importance of Low-Cost
Poor: “As for the C-5A, it was a watershed. Its cost overrun crossed the billion-dollar
line, thus engineering the transition of public perception of the military-buying system
and the defense industry from a team that could invent anything, that could turn
technology into first-rate hardware unequalled anywhere, to an apparatus that was
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wasteful, dishonest and incapable of producing anything that worked or stayed within
cost targets” (Gregory, 1989:107-108).
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs
Good: Fixed-Price, Incentive Fee Contract (Griffin, 2005:vii).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost
Average: “Originally structured to concentrate efforts on monitoring and controlling
weight growth, it evolved into a plan dedicated primarily to reduce weight and cost”
(Griffin, 2005:28).
“C-5A program was plagued by cost overruns from the very beginning. The cost overrun
was not unexpected by either the Air Force or the contractor” (Griffin, 2005:22).
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs
Average: “The SPO’s performance in exercising their responsibility to balance the
requirements with the design risk was less than stellar” (Griffin, 2005:20).
SIMPLE
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems
Average: “The study outcome narrowed the range of the aircraft weight to between
650,000 and 750,000 pounds, a large increase over the state of the art, but not a quantum
leap over vehicles in the inventory or in development during the mid-1960s” (Griffin,
2005:18).
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology
Good: “With respect to the airframe, there is no large advance in the current state-of-theart, and the technological building blocks are in hand. The Air Force is able to specify
the desired performance with precision and with reasonable expectation that this
performance can be achieved” (Griffin, 2005:21).
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas
Good: “…the landing gear was somewhat simplified by removing the crosswind feature”
(Griffin, 2005:18).
Importance of Simplicity
Good: “Creep comes from “over perfect” engineering: continuously trying to improve an
acceptable design to make it better. Systems engineers must follow the mantra of “better
is the enemy of good enough.” The greatest contributor to requirements creep, however,
is often the user. If personnel from the user community have constant access to the
contractor, design changes will be continuous and never ending. The C-5 SPO team
managed the inputs of non-SPO people by controlling all changes via the SPO’s
Configuration Control Board (CCB)” (Griffin, 2005:20).
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“… the C-5 was to have an unusual drive-through main cabin, with vast cargo doors at
both front and rear. In fact, the whole nose section of the airplane swung up and over the
cockpit. And the landing gear could kneel, adjusting on the ground for differing loadingramp heights. On top of that complexity, the C-5A looked like a winged centipede on the
ground because of short but heavy struts supporting a couple of dozen balloon tires to
allow it to land on grass fields” (Gregory, 1989:109).
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent
Excellent: “The SPO had the power, ability, priority, and senior leadership support to
quickly rally the best minds in the nation” (Griffin, 2005:43).
TINY
Importance of Small
Average: “But building a big airplane like the C-5A was not just a matter of scaling up
the smaller C-141. When the increase in size passed a certain point, technical challenges
and changes cropped up” (Gregory, 1989:110).
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size
Good: “…a well-balanced, well-understood set of requirements that fundamentally
remained unchanged throughout the program” (Griffin, 2005:42).
“Requirements were controlled exceptionally well during development” (Griffin,
2005:20).
“When the C-5 aircraft first entered the inventory in 1970, it was the largest aircraft in the
world, and it is still the largest transport cargo aircraft in our inventory. It was the first of
the behemoths” (Griffin, 2005:v).
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size
Good: “The Air Force included the weight empty guarantee in the systems specification
as an attempt to control potential future growth of the aircraft weight empty during
development” (Griffin, 2005:43).
OUTCOME
Success: “The success of the C-5 transport aircraft is underscored by the performance of
the fleet as an operational system and its heavy lift support in all of our conflicts from
Vietnam to Iraq. It still accomplishes tasks that no other military aircraft, such as the new
C-17 or any derivative of commercial cargo aircraft, can perform, and has consistently
carried more cargo than any other aircraft in the time of war” (Griffin, 2005:vi).
“The C-5A fleet has demonstrated success in operation, but, as will be discussed, the
development of the aircraft was plagued by a major technical failure in the design of the
structure, most notably the wing and pylon” (Griffin, 2005:5-6).
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Appendix G: Alternatives Pairwise Comparisons
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